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The health reform legislation debate of the past year has been
heavily laced with rhetoric about our nation's historic and
continuing failure to effectively contain health care costs.
National health insurance proposals have surfaced periodically
since the early 1930s. With the exception of Medicare and
Medicaid, most have not survived the political gauntlet. Thirty-
five years ago, the country seemed primed for change, but the
political wisdom determined that system controls should be
implemented before any movement was attempted in a direction
akin to a national health insurance program. That reform
legislation - the last true attempt at substantive systemic
interaction - lasted for only nine years before it was repealed. The
only vestiges remaining, the certificate-of-need programs that
continue to exist in select states, operate without much apparent
impact on costs. This Essay will look at the history of certificate-
of-need in Rhode Island, showing how its shortcomings were
identified from a very early stage, and why its impact on cost has
* Gerard R. Goulet is a partner with the firm of Hinckley, Allen & Snyder,
L.L.P., with offices in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and
Connecticut. His primary practice area is health care. He served as the
Chief Administrative Officer of the Rhode Island Certificate-of-Need program
from 1978 through 1981 and has represented clients in certificate-of-need
matters over the ensuing thirty years. The views expressed are those of the
author, derived from his experiences as a regulatory attorney over that time
period.
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been minimal at best. In so doing, this Essay will also attempt to
explain why certificate-of-need remains an annual lightning rod
for spirited legislative debate despite the fact (or perhaps because)
it has been a greater force for preservation of the systemic status
quo than would likely have been the case had no such law been
enacted.
INTRODUCTION
One recurrent criticism of the effort to reform health care in
2009 has been the attention paid to expanding health insurance
coverage in contrast with the scant relative attention paid to
controlling health care costs. This criticism brings to mind the
nearly reverse situation that characterized the last major attempt
to achieve structural change to the health care system as a
precursor to the adoption of a national health insurance program.
Thirty-five years ago, the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974 ("NHPRDA")i was enacted
shortly after Congress came as close as it has in history to passing
a true national health insurance act. 2 The goal of the NHPRDA
was to bring rationality to health care decision making by giving
states monetary incentives to engage in planning, to implement
capital expenditure controls through compliant certificate-of-need
programs, to review federal grant-making and to initiate
appropriateness review of existing health services. 3  The
NHPRDA lasted less than ten years and left behind little trace
other than certificate-of-need programs in half of the nation's
states.4 Originally instituted, at least in part, for reasons of cost
containment, certificate-of-need programs provide little by way of
1. See generally Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974), amended by
Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979), partially repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 701,
100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
2. DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER:
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 244-47 (2009).
3. See Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974).
4. Id., amended by Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979), partially
repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986). Those of
us who lived through the repeal did not understand it to be a partial repeal.
Certainly as to certificate-of-need there was no longer any federal money to
support it.
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conclusive evidence of their power to constrain costs. Nonetheless,
they continue to exist in states like Rhode Island. To understand
the reasons for that continued existence, a review of the highlights
of the Rhode Island program over the last forty years may be
instructive.
In reviewing the history of a program that has undergone so
many legislative amendments over the course of its existence5 and
that interconnects with, influences and is affected by so many
other voluntary and mandatory planning and regulatory
programs, the choice of highlights is personal and reflects my own
views and not the views of any other individual.
I. CERTIFICATE OF NEED AS A REGULATORY CONCEPT
The franchising aspects of public utility regulation were first
adopted under the rubric "certificate-of-need" in 1964 in the State
of New York as a partial response to the perceived
cost-accelerating overcapacity of facilities and equipment in the
hospital sector.6
The underlying (and somewhat flawed) premise of the
regulatory scheme was that the major component of price
increases in the health care sector was attributable to the
non-payroll cost increases in rent, depreciation, interest,
equipment and supplies which accompanied the overcapacity
referred to above, which over-supply generated a self-fulfilling
demand for use. It was felt that only by the imposition of external
controls, subjecting all significant investments to public scrutiny,
would an alleviation of resource allocation inefficiency be assured.
The mechanism, as designed, required review of
health-related capital expenditures in hospitals and other health
care facilities to assure: (1) compliance with rational planning
guidelines; (2) rational allocation of limited resources, with
emphasis on satisfaction of a legitimate need as opposed to
satisfaction of an induced demand; and (3) reduction of duplication
and under-utilization. Controls were limited to the introduction of
5. Of the forty-two years of its existence in Rhode Island, the certificate-
of-need law was amended in twenty-five of those years, often more than once
in the course of a given year.
6. Gerard Romeo Goulet, Lessons for Health Planning: The Certificate-
of-Need Experience in Rhode Island 4 (1975) (on file with author).
129
130 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:127
new equipment or construction, or the expansion and
modernization of such, and the effect upon existing entities was in
the nature of an economic protectionist device, the sole sanction,
for the most part, being the drastic and infeasible one of
revocation or denial of licensure.
Certificate-of-need-type regulations had been used in Europe,
in Britain, Scandinavia and on the continent.7 The European
tendency was to look at the number of beds needed rather than at
the number currently demanded, implying a mechanism for
providing alternative ways of meeting demands.8 The essence of
American certificate-of-need legislation, in general, and of the
Rhode Island legislation, in particular, was and remains to
provide the statutory ability to refuse permission to build beds or
provide services, without providing any counter-balancing
authority to initiate action to either build more beds when they
are needed or develop alternative patterns of care that would
make more beds unnecessary.9
Certificate-of-need has had a long history in Rhode Island.
Only the second state in the nation to have enacted a program of
capital expenditure review (after New York), Rhode Island is
unlike many other states in that its history is far less reflective of
the Federal legislative promotion of capital expenditure review
that occurred from 1972 through 1986. Even in its years of
compliance with Federal requirements, the program has been
fundamentally state-oriented.
A. The Brosco Commission
Resolution #39 of the January 1966 session of the General
Assembly called for the creation of a "Commission to Investigate
Hospital Room Rates and Study the Advisability of Placing Such
Rates Under State Regulation."to Chaired by Anthony J. Brosco,
a state legislator with political aspirations for higher office, it
consisted of seven legislators, four representatives of the public
and three ex-officio members, the Director of Health, the State
Budget Officer and the Fiscal Assistant to the House Finance
7. Brian Abel-Smith, Value for Money in Health Services, 37 SOCLAL
SECURITY BULLETIN 17, 22 (July 1974).
8. Goulet, supra note 6, at 107.
9. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-15-4 (1956).
10. Goulet, supra note 6, at 40.
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Committee,11 and was served by a team of four consultants from
Columbia, Duke and Harvard Universities. 12
The report of the Commission, entitled "Hospital Costs in
Rhode Island," was completed on April 14, 1967, and addressed, as
its critical issue, the financial situation of the individual
hospitals. 13 From the start, the focus of certificate-of-need in
Rhode Island was on the hospital sector.14 As the report
indicated, there was a clamor for government to do something
about rising hospital costs and charges.15 In fact, the language in
the report's introduction could have been written in the context of
the current debate about Federal health reform.16
11. The members of the Commission were: Representative Anthony J.
Brosco, Chairman; Paul F. Murray, Attorney, Vice Chairman; Philip J.
Campana, C.P.A.; Joseph E. Cannon, M.D., M.P.H., Director of Health;
Representative Joseph A. Capineri; William J. DeNuccio (successor to
Howard A. Kenyon), Fiscal Assistant to the House Finance Committee;
Representative Raymond M. Durfee; Senator Francis J. LaChapelle; Senator
Henry E. Laliberte; Representative Alfred R. Moan; John C. Murray, State
Budget Officer; Senator Charles A. Perry, Jr.; William L. Reiff, President,
Almacs, Inc.; and William K. Turner, Director, Newport Hospital.
COMMIssIoN TO INVESTIGATE HOSPITAL ROOM RATES AND STUDY THE
ADVISABILITY OF PLACING SUCH RATES UNDER STATE REGULATION, HOSPITAL
COSTS IN RHODE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, S. Res. 39, January
1966 Sess., at iii (Apr. 1967).
12. Id. at iv. The consultants and their positions in 1967 were: Ray E.
Trussell, M.D., M.P.H., Associate Dean (Public Health), Director, School of
Public Health and Administrative Medicine, and DeLamar Professor of
Administrative Medicine, Columbia University; Ray E. Brown, Director,
Graduate Program in Hospital Administration, Duke University; Jerome
Pollack, Associate Dean for Medical Care Planning, Harvard Medical School,
Professor of Economics of Medical Care, Harvard University; and Charles
Roswell, Adjunct Associate Professor of Administrative Medicine, Columbia
University. Id.
13. See generally id.
14. "Resolved, [t]hat a Commission be and the same is hereby created
consisting of fourteen (14) members . . . and whose purpose it shall be to
investigate hospital room rates and study the advisability of placing such
rates under state regulation." Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 2. "The Commission was not created by accident. Rising tax
supported appropriations for hospital care of the needy are a problem in
Rhode Island as well as in other States and in Washington. Such increases
cannot be voted through blindly year after year. There is a genuine and often
expressed need in the Legislature and by the public for better understanding
of the justification for such increases and for assurance that hospitals are
making every effort to keep their costs and charges as low as possible
consistent with a high quality of care of the sick. Equally pressing are the
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After studying Blue Cross subscriber coverage, changes in
hospital bed complement, comparisons of hospital costs and
charges, hospital capital indebtedness and hospital working
capital, the Commission concluded that the overall financial
condition of hospitals was a "relatively weak one." 17
The members analyzed the high cost of unoccupied beds and
emphasized the fact that associated fixed charges were "loaded" on
the charges to paying patients, Blue Cross and the government.18
The Commission also emphasized the tendency toward greater
and unnecessary utilization and was concerned about the
potential impact of "reasonable cost" reimbursement, structured
without incentives for efficient management, under Medicare, and
particularly, for the state of Rhode Island, under Medicaid.19 The
prime concern of the Commission in this area was that costs
attributable to community service, standby-expenses, bad debts
and contractual write-offs would be loaded onto the private pay
patients in the form of increased charges in order to maintain
sufficient operating income. 20 This, it was feared, would further
undermine accessibility to hospital-based services.
The Commission was interested in the relatively newly
legislated comprehensive health planning programs, recognized
reactions of people who have some hospitalization insurance, yet who find
themselves confronted with out of pocket expenditures - often very large - at
the time of an illness requiring hospital care." Id.
17. Id. at 29. Forty years later, the diagnosis as to the health of our
hospitals has changed very little. "Unless systemic changes are made, most
community hospitals will face continued financial trouble in the coming
years. A few hospitals will face more difficulty in the next 2 years, and one
community hospital is in dire financial trouble right now." GARY D.
ALEXANDER & CHRISTOPHER F. KOLLER, CMTY. HosP. TASK FORCE, REPORT OF
THE CMTY HOSP. TASK FORCE 3 (June 3, 2008), available at
http://www.ohic.ri.gov/documents/Committees/Final%20community%20hospit
al%20taskforce/CHTF%20Letter%20and%20Final%20Report.pdf. "In 2008,
the financial 'health' of RI's hospitals deteriorated. Statewide profitability
declined from 3.5% to 0.1%, and net worth fell 12%." BRUCE CRYAN, R.I.
DEPT. OF HEALTH, THE HEALTH OF RHODE ISLAND'S HOSPITALS (2008): A
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 1 (July 2009), available at
http://www.health.ri.gov/publications/reports/HealthOfHospitals.pdf.
18. COMMIsSION TO INVESTIGATE HOSPITAL ROOM RATES AND STUDY THE
ADVISABILITY OF PLACING SUCH RATES UNDER STATE REGULATION, HOSPITAL
COSTS IN RHODE ISLAND: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, S. Res. 39, Jan. 1966
Sess., at 30 (Apr. 1967) (on file with author).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 33.
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the need for promotion of alternatives to the use of expensive
in-hospital care such as out-patient diagnostic services, nursing
homes and home care, and spoke of the need to broaden
ambulatory care and promote group practice prepayment
organizations in order to reduce in-patient admissions. 21  It
recognized the hospitals' collective history of voluntary efforts to
control costs, including: (1) subscription to the Professional
Activities Study (PAS), Medical Audit Program (MAP), and
Hospital Administration Services (HAS); (2) establishment of
utilization review committees long before Medicare made their use
mandatory; (3) establishment of a fifteen day recertification of
medical need program at least a year before Medicare made it
mandatory; (4) group purchasing by hospitals; (5) uniform cost
accounting and reporting for third party payors; (6) voluntary
discontinuation of the obstetrical service at Roger Williams
Hospital; and (7) pilot programs with Blue Cross for home care at
Kent County Hospital and for extended patient care at Newport
Hospital.22  Notwithstanding these efforts, the Commission
pointed out that 42% of Blue Cross subscribers under sixty-five
were covered by indemnity-type policies covering from $8 to $20
per day in the face of an average per diem semi-private charge of
$35.54.23
The Commission met for more than a year, listened to
testimony of national and local experts, and submitted four
recommendations to the legislature in April of 1967.24 Of the four
recommendations set forth in the Commission's report, the only
one that was acted upon was the one that called for establishment
by law of a Health Services Council, representative of the public,
providers, and payers, to review proposals for hospital
construction. 25
21. Id. at 35-36.
22. Id. at 36-38.
23. Id. at 32.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 48-49. "Recommendation One - A Rhode Island Health
Services Council or Commission should be established by law to bring
together the community and the government in a joint effort to fuse the basic
public responsibility with the resources of the voluntary sector. This citizen
council appropriately appointed as determined by the law should represent
the public, consumer groups, professions, Blue Cross, health facilities and
government. An appropriate precedent for such a Council exists in New York
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Apart from citing the reference to New York State's
pre-existing capital expenditure review program, the Commission
report was silent on the costs, benefits or theoretical economic
underpinnings of capital expenditure review as a form of economic
regulation.26 In fact, the first significant scholarly effort of note
was not published until five years after the Rhode Island program
had been enacted. 27
The Commission report was submitted too late for legislative
action by the 1967 legislature; however, the 1968 legislature
amended the Hospital Licensure Act to provide for a capital
expenditures review program with three of the five initial
statutory review criteria focused on avoidance of duplication: (1)
the availability of facilities or services which may serve as
alternatives or substitutes for the construction; (2) the need for
special equipment in view of existing utilization of comparable
equipment, and (3) possible economies from operation of joint
central services. 28 Effective January 1, 1969, a Health Services
Council was to be appointed by representatives of government to
conduct the reviews and advise the Director of Health. 29
B. The Health Services Council
Appointment of the Health Services Council members was
delayed by a change of administration and clarifications afforded
by an additional amendment to the law,30 such that the Council
did not hold its first meeting until November 5, 1969.31
These earliest years of the certificate-of-need program were
marked by tension among the leadership of the Health
Department, the Hospital Association of Rhode Island ("HARI"),
Blue Cross of Rhode Island and the State Budget Office. The
Health Department was not enthralled with the role thrust upon
State . . . . The Council should pass on all proposals for establishment,
expansion or substantial modification of hospitals which should be made
uniformly subject to approval of the Director of Health after receiving the
advice of the Council." Id.
26. See generally id.
27. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities
and Services by "Certificate of Need", 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973).
28. 1968 R.I. Pub. Laws 1458-1460.
29. 1968 R.I. Pub. Laws 1460.
30. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws 84-85.
31. Goulet, supra note 6, at 46.
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it - one that expected it to deny capital development. 32 The
agency had as a core philosophy facilitating the provision of
additional health care services, and it was uncomfortable with its
potential new power to deny providers the right to provide
additional services. HARI, for its part, feared that the
Department would take to this new role with a vengeance and
that only HARI institutions - the hospitals - would be affected.
Blue Cross of Rhode Island and the State Budget Office were
skeptical that the Health Department would have the intestinal
fortitude to make the hard decisions. 33
The tone of the organizational meeting of the Council was one
of extreme caution, as evidenced by the adoption of executive
sessions, and the exclusion of the press. 34 The Council was
confused about the nature of its jurisdiction and the members
seemed somewhat ambivalent toward their potential roles as
regulators. 35
By April of 1969, rules and regulations had been largely
developed by the Health Department staff with the assistance of a
professional consultant and experts in specific areas of costs,
charges, inspections, utilization, quality of care, planning and
construction. Meetings were then held with representatives of the
hospitals, the voluntary and pre-existing Health Planning Council
and the Rhode Island Medical Society to arrive at a final draft of
the regulations. In the regulations presented to the Health
32. Interview with Joseph E. Cannon, M.D., Former Dir. of Health, R.I.
Dep't of Health; Interview with John T. Tierney, Former Deputy Dir. of
Health, R.I. Dep't of Health.
33. Interview with Armand Leco, Former Vice President, Blue Cross of
R.I.; Interview with John C. Murray, Former Budget Director, State of R.I.
Budget Office.
34. Goulet, supra note 6, at 117.
35. The membership was further confused as to the extent of its
authority by the stance of Dr. Cannon, who offered the honest opinion that
the Department of Health had no power to control hospital costs but that by
gathering information, making comparisons and dealing directly with
hospitals on occasion, it could be shown that steps could be taken by the
hospitals to at least warrant a regular pattern of rising costs. It was outlined
to the members of the Council that over 70% of hospital costs were
attributable to labor and that virtually little opportunity existed to turn back
the number of wage increases of recent years. This pronouncement, although
an accurate appraisal of the situation, left the membership with only the
prevention of duplication as a primary mission through a straightforward
entry control mechanism.
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Services Council for final review, the expenditure limits requiring
review were raised from the original $50,000, or 1% of the
hospital's physical asset value, to $200,000, or 3%, thereby
allowing substantial (for 1970) construction or equipment
replacement (together with the attendant annualized personnel
costs) to take place without prior review by the Council. 36 The
remainder of the Council's meetings through June 19, 1970 was
spent approving these regulations.
In essence, the regulations restated that construction projects
of a substantial nature required approval of the licensing agency,
to which the Health Services Council was the advisory body.37
Approval was to be sought by the filing of an application
consisting of two parts: (1) the letter of intent, upon which the
licensing agency had to render a decision within sixty to ninety
days; and (2) if the letter of intent was approved, the formal
application, upon which the licensing agency had to render a
decision within six months. 38 The applicant was afforded
appellate rights through a public hearing presided over by the
Health Department with further redress affordable through the
Superior Court.3 9
However, in the opinion of the Department of Health, prior
approval of hospital construction by the Health Services Council
after demonstration of public need could not become operative
until the regulations were formally adopted and promulgated. 40
As a result, no applications for construction could be reviewed
prior to September 3, 1970, when the regulations became official,
and none were presented prior to the Health Services Council's
first meeting of 1971.
At the close of 1971, the first full year of the Council, little, if
anything, had been accomplished by its members. The Council
had met fourteen times, adjourning once without a quorum.41
Four proposals for substantial construction had been received and
36. Goulet, supra note 6, at 184.
37. Id. at 172-75 (referencing the 1969 version of R.I. GEN. LAWs §
23-16-12).
38. Id. at 184, 187.
39. Id. at 190-91 (referencing the 1969 version of R.I. GEN. LAWS §
23-16-9).
40. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35 (2010).
41. Goulet, supra note 6, at 52.
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acted upon and two others antedating the effective date of the law
had been reviewed without action.42 Review time had been
extremely limited with the letter of intent and formal application
actions occurring at the same meeting for all approvals. As the
chief of the division of planning and standards, which served as
staff to the Council, noted in a February 4, 1972 report to the
Council: "Judged by proposals acted upon, the effectiveness of the
franchising provisions of the law have not been great, but staff
have observed a marked deterrent effect on uncoordinated
planning from the mere existence of the mechanism." 43 The
Council's growing pains continued into 1972 and have been
extensively detailed elsewhere.44
In its early years, the Council was delayed in developing its
abilities by a number of factors, including: (1) uncommitted and
inadequate staffing; (2) failure to establish clearly defined internal
administrative procedures, criteria to govern review, or bylaws to
govern the Council's structure and function; and (3) attempting to
compete with the pre-existing, voluntary Health Planning Council
rather than utilizing its talents. 45
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation in the Health Care
System, 48 HOSPITALs J.A.H.A. 65-71 (1974). The validity of this statement is
not easily ascertained. The long and short range plans submitted by the
hospitals for fiscal year 1973 proposed over $25,000,000 in capital
expenditures for short term projects with little, if any, planning coordination
noticeable. This concept of a deterrent effect was to be a recurrent theme in
future justifications for the continued existence of the program.
44. See id. at 42-58.
45. Id. at 156-57. As an example, in one of its early reviews, prior to the
advent of written reports, the Health Services Council, in its approval of the
Pawtucket Memorial Hospital replacement of nonconforming beds, was
subjected to criticism for its divergence from the Health Planning Council's
advisory on the application.
The Health Planning Council had suggested elimination of
Memorial's obstetrics department, in keeping with its commitment to
consolidate obstetrics services for the Providence area into one facility.
Conversion of the freed beds to medical/surgical would have reduced the
hospital's need for expansion by twenty-six beds. The Health Services
Council believed such a proposal to be in error in recognition of the Memorial
Hospital's reputation for the broadest scope of community services in the
state and its high occupancy rate in obstetrics, and (assuming it had the
authority to do so) was not presented with sufficient evidence to mandate
elimination of the hospital's entire obstetrics capability (the second largest in
the state). Although the Council's credibility was substantially uplifted,
137
138 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:127
In any event, through 1973, the Health Services Council
continued to take no active planning role, and due to its lack of
standards, criteria, and internal rules of order, could not be
effectively measured in terms either of its process or its outcome.
The Department failed to allow for evaluation of the process on
either a continuing or periodic basis and, apart from paying
lip-service to the notion of a more concerted planning effort on the
part of hospitals, was not able, in any quantitative manner, to
measure the impact on either costs or utilization of the reviews by
the Council.
The year 1974 marked a maturation in a number of respects.
The Council began to issue written reports in recognition of the
Council's inability to operate much longer on the basis of decisions
particularly among residents of the Blackstone Valley community, approval
of the Pawtucket Memorial proposal unleashed a fair amount of controversy
within the state. The failure of the Department of Health to mandate closing
of the hospital's obstetrics unit in accordance with the Health Planning
Council's advisory on the matter or with its previous policy statement on the
consolidation of obstetrics facilities, brought sharp attacks from the Health
Planning Council itself, the Lying-In Hospital (now Women & Infants
Hospital of Rhode Island and chief beneficiary of the obstetrics consolidation
plan) and the Executive Director of Blue Cross, who chastised the
Department of Health for its failure to act upon the issue of underutilized
facilities. For its part, the Health Services Council essentially adopted a
position of rationality in the control of costs and reallocation of resources,
consistent with its view of the due process requirements inherent in the
exercise of its statutory responsibility and implied that the process would, at
its level, involve consideration of elements apart from a strict analysis of cost.
However, none of its reasoning was documented.
Although the rationale for Health Services Council decision making
was documented in its later reports, on those occasions when the
recommendation to the Director of Health differed from the advisory of the
Health Planning Council, there was no attempt made to explicitly set forth
the relevant differences.
The staff to the Health Services Council should have recognized that
the existence of the Health Planning Council in a radical or extremist role
was of value to the effectiveness of the Health Services Council in its
reallocation role. Had not the Health Planning Council been able to react
negatively to politically sensitive proposals, it is difficult to believe the
Health Services Council could have effected any type of compromise or
amendment to the applications it reviewed.
The Health Services Council, had it been the only reviewing agency,
would perhaps, in many situations, have been forced to bow to political
pressures, whereas, it could reach practical decisions and effect reallocations
as a counterpoint to the Health Planning Council's recommendations of
outright denial.
2010] CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED OVER HOSPITALS
handed down from executive sessions - decisions which did not
delineate in great detail the exact nature of the investigations
conducted or the exact nature of the rationale leading to approval
or disapproval. 46 In terms of decisions rendered, the Council
matured to a considerable extent in its evaluation of applicant
evidence of need and in its analysis of the financial impact of
projects. It was able to force the withdrawal of an application that
proposed commercial financing when the option of a tax-free bond
issue (at a considerably reduced interest rate) was available. 47
Another hospital was forced to resubmit its plans for laboratory
expansion due to its failure to convincingly document a need for
the expansion in the face of potential changes to the health
delivery system in the area. 48 A third hospital was forced to
abandon its expansion of a special care unit and scale down the
scope of its kitchen renovation considerably. 49 The Council also
embarked on a significant venture into planning and allocation of
resources in its modification of the proposals of two other
hospitals, through negotiations that culminated in each hospital
providing separately licensed skilled nursing units.50
The year 1974, therefore, was marked by increased
sophistication and intense activity on the part of the Health
Services Council. In the course of only seven meetings, it
approved eight capital expenditures projects for hospitals totaling
$7,670,000, disapproved one project totaling $450,000, and forced
withdrawal of a $1,500,000 project.51 Review times exceeded
seven months for the most part.52
The year 1974 also marked the entry of the Council into the
arena of nursing home proposals, and marked a new era for the
Council in terms of pressure and politics, as the Council
attempted to embark on a relatively unfamiliar course in the
regulation of the largely proprietary, affluent, and well-connected
nursing home industry. 53 Cost containment results in this arena
46. Id. at 62, 65.
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 66-67.
51. Id. at 65-67.
52. Id. at 65, 68.
53. Id. at 68.
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would fall far short of the effort exerted. Because of generous
grandfathering provisions, 54 the need for additional nursing home
construction was not readily apparent. Accordingly, over the first
year of its active review of nursing home proposals, the Council
tightened its requirements in a series of steps designed to prevent
new nursing home applications from being initiated and to provide
more grounds on which to base disapprovals because of the
Department's conviction that the need for nursing home beds
statewide was nearly satisfied.55 As a result, the initial nursing
home proposals were subject to a much more detailed analysis
than had been the case for hospital applications.
However, as a purely reactive agency, the Health Services
Council could not enforce the closing of those facilities that had
been allowed to continue in operation as a result of intense
lobbying and the granting of fire code variances. As a result, the
Council spent the next several years attempting to hold the line on
additional nursing home construction. Indeed, the Council faced
intense pressure from the construction industries and the
legislature acting in the interests of contractors for promotion of
employment, in the interests of present owners wishing to replace
non-conforming facilities and in the interest of developers wishing
to build entirely new facilities. Existing providers were unhappy,
as were prospective providers. In this arena, the Council
experienced the difficult balance between cost containment and
stifling competition in a way that would never occur for hospital
proposals.
At this point in time, the Council was beginning to look at the
performance of the Rhode Island program in comparison with
other programs across the country. As of January 1974 (before
the passage of the NHPRDA), twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia had enacted certificate-of-need legislation. 56 Seven
54. Id. at 70.
55. These actions took place on December 10, 1974, although the criteria
so designated had been in use since July 1974. See id. at 204.
56. See ROBERT JAMES CIMAsI, THE U.S. HEALTHCARE CERTIFICATE OF
NEED SOURCEBOOK 22-23 (Beard Books 2005) (noting that the twenty-two
states were: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington). North Carolina's law
was repealed by a state Supreme Court decision declaring it to be
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other states passed similar statutes within the following three
years. 57 In addition, thirty-seven states had signed agreements to
implement section 1122 of the 1972 Amendments to the Social
Security Act, Public Law 92-603,58 which had established a capital
expenditure review requirement for health care facilities or HMOs
participating in the Medicare, Medicaid or maternal and child
health programs.5 9
Despite the widespread adoption of certificate-of-need-type
laws and the espousal of the concept by the Federal government,
they were controversial as was evidenced by the number of court
cases in various states6o and by the comparisons of such
regulation to that of public utilities largely considered by experts
in law and economics to have been of ambiguous value. 61
unconstitutional. Id.
57. See id. (listing the seven states as: Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois,
Montana, Ohio and Texas).
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Those states that had not signed 1122 agreements were: Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia. Only West
Virginia did not have either type of regulatory mechanism at that time.
60. See In Matter of Certification-of-Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193
S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 1973); Attoma v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 270 N.Y.S.2d
167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Woodland Park Hosp., Inc. v. Comprehensive
Health Planning Auth., 504 P.2d 753 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (the issues
addressed include: (1) regulation of construction involving private funds only;
(2) the danger of creating monopolies by restricting competition; (3) the
imposition of regulation on construction without the accompanying regulation
of hospital rates; (4) the validity of the criteria used in judging need; and (5)
the adequacy of the hearing procedures).
61. See generally Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 THE BELL
J. OF ECON. AND MANAGEMENT Scl. 22 (1971); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 THE BELL J. OF ECON. AND MANAGEMENT Sc. 3 (1971).
Due to costs of administration and the invariable protection offered to
previously existing providers, certificate-of-need laws were (and continue to
be) accused of having an opposite effect from that of lowering or restraining
costs. They have been alleged to:
(1) raise costs, eroding thereby the potential profitability of
monopoly pricing;
(2) contribute to misallocation by virtue of cross subsidization
schemes to preserve comprehensiveness of services;
(3) protect producers through guaranteed markets;
(4) delay or prevent technological innovation; and
(5) induce inefficiency.
In this context, collective determination of the bed supply becomes a form of
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There was certainly reason to look upon the development of
such laws with suspicion, particularly since hospitals themselves
had been instrumental in securing their passage in many states.
The argument proposed most often in support of the adoption of
such laws revolved around the notion of "cream-skimming" - the
theory that new competition deprives existing providers of
essential revenues, thereby disrupting their internal subsidization
capabilities and jeopardizing their ability to provide useful
services at prices below costs. This argument depends on the
assumption that the comprehensiveness of health services offered
by an institution is an inherently desirable aspect and that
hospitals depend on internal subsidies to support indigent care. 62
The arguments for and against public utility regulation of the
health industry, and particularly certificate-of-need, had been
addressed by many authors by 1973,63 and they made an
impression on Council staff. At this juncture, staff began to look
at the impact on costs of the certificate-of-need program. Only
1.3% of Rhode Island's total health expenditures for 1972 were
allocated to construction in comparison with the U.S. average of
4.7%. However, it was impossible to demonstrate any direct
impact upon costs as a result of the impact of certificate-of-need.
The inherent problem remained that capital construction expenses
were minor in comparison to those for labor and supplies. An
emphasis on hospital programs and hospital expenses, nearly two-
thirds of which were attributable to labor, had to be incorporated
as an adjunct to the capital expenditure restrictions if certificate-
of-need was to have any chance of having an impact on hospital
output restriction and the allocation of geographical or activity-related areas
of responsibility becomes an example of monopolistic market division.
Havighurst, supra note 27, at 1149. Although such cartel-like practices may
be allowed in industries replete with third party payment and non-profit
firms, self-interest can undermine any potential for rational reallocation.
62. Havighurst, supra note 27, at 1164.
63. See id. at 1143-1232. See also Roger G. Noll, Public Utility
Regulation of Hospitals: On Snatching Catastrophe From the Jaws of Crisis,
Presented at the Program in Hospital and Health Care Administration, Univ.
of Minn., (Oct. 3, 1973); Anne R. Somers, "State Regulation of Hospitals and
Health Care: "The New Jersey Story," Blue Cross Reports Research Series 11,
July 1973; Anne R. Somers, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC
POLICY (Princeton Univ. Press 1969); The International Health Advisory
Council and Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM ON
HOSPITAL FRANCHISING (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc. 1973).
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costs. This was underscored by the experience with room charges,
which were the impetus, however unreasonable, for the
investigations of the Brosco Commission. According to HARI, the
per-day average for semi-private rooms at the fourteen voluntary
short-term hospitals more than doubled from $35.54 in December
1966 to $82.25 by October 1974.64 Also, in the period from 1966 to
1973, inpatient routine and ancillary per diem cost increased from
$44.91 to $108.12.65 So, at least in the period leading up to
NHPRDA, cost containment did not seem to be a hallmark of
Rhode Island's certificate-of-need program.
A strength of the Council, however, was in the area of
education of hospitals through policy statements similar to that
issued on December 3, 1974, concerning the financing of capital
expenditures. 66  The requirement that hospitals explore the
relative merits of several alternative types of financing helped to
preclude dependence on high interest borrowings from area banks
in favor of issuance of tax exempt revenue bonds, at a savings to
the reimbursement system and, ultimately, to the community.6 7
The requirements of complete amortization schedules,
demonstrations of cash flows during the period of capital financing
and the depreciable life of the proposed asset, and use of present
worth analysis in determining purchase-lease advantages,
demanded an unprecedented sophistication on the part of hospital
financial managers.6 8 In addition, the number of projects that
underwent some modification as a result of the Council's
recommendations demonstrated a transition from passive to
active review. Although the changes may have had little impact
on the rise in costs, the Council sought to effect reallocations in
the health system through approvals of configurations more in
keeping with eventual shifts in the health delivery system.
Herein lay its future.
The legislative politics of certificate-of-need were also made
clear for the first time when on May 10, 1974, section 12 of
chapter 16 of the General Laws was amended by insertion of the
following language:
64. Goulet, supra note 6, at 131.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 199-201.
67. Id. at 200.
68. Id.
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When an application is made for a certificate-of-need to
construct or to expand an osteopathic facility the need for
such facility shall be determined on the need and
availability in the community for osteopathic services and
facilities.69
The amendment was passed at a time when disapproval of the
formal application of the Cranston General Hospital for an
increased capacity of twenty-six beds was imminent. It effectively
checked the Council and the Department from rendering a
disapproval since the osteopathic need per se had not previously
been at issue. The Council agreed that the amendment rendered
the application before it incomplete and that a new application
and review complying with the requirements of Rhode Island
General Laws section 23-16-12, as amended, 70 was in order. As a
result, the Director of Health, noting that the action taken was not
to be deemed a disapproval of the application but a step taken in
the best interest of the parties, denied the application without
prejudice to the right of the hospital to submit a new
application. 71 This statutory amendment revealed a fatal flaw of
the certificate-of-need legislation in that any special interest
group, be it osteopathic, community, municipality or religious
organization, could undermine any attempt at a rationalization of
the health system by appealing to the legislature for either special
consideration or an exclusion.
By 1975, this flaw manifested itself in the form of additional
bills before the General Assembly relating to the Health Services
Council, which sought to abolish or delimit its functions or to
clarify its jurisdiction. 72 The fact that delimiting bills had been
introduced was considered to be adequate testimony that the
Health Services Council had begun to have an impact.
Interestingly, opposition to the delimiting bills came largely from
69. 1974 R.I. Pub. Laws 1348.
70. Goulet, supra note 6, at 61-62 (referencing the 1974 amendment to
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16-12).
71. Id. at 62.
72. 75-H 5835, introduced on March 21, 1975, proposed to abolish the
Health Services Council and 75-H 5836, also introduced on March 21, 1975,
proposed to repeal the responsibilities of the Health Services Council as they
related to nursing or personal care homes while 75-H 6339, introduced on
April 10, 1975, proposed to clarify the functions of the Health Services
Council with respect to construction of nursing and personal care facilities.
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the regulated, notably from HARI and the trade association of the
for-profit nursing homes.
II. LEGISLATING COMPLIANCE WITH NHPRDA
The history of the early certificate-of-need program in Rhode
Island from 1969 through 1974 has been detailed previously. 73 As
of the end of 1974, the Rhode Island certificate-of-need program
covered hospitals, nursing homes and health maintenance
organizations. Osteopathic hospitals, for their part, had received
the first legislative exception.
On January 4, 1975, the President of the United States signed
into law Public Law 93-641, "The National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974."74 From the perspective of
state government, the Act generated a significant amount of
controversy because it effectively reduced state control over health
resources and the health system in virtually every state, through
the division of the country into 202 health systems areas, the
establishment of non-governmental health system agencies within
such areas, and the allocation of substantial authority to the
health systems agencies and to consumer dominated Statewide
Health Coordinating Councils. 75 As a result of sectionl53676 of
73. See generally Havighurst, supra note 27.
74. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974), amended by Health
Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979), partially repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660 § 701, 100
Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986); see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health
Planning and Regulation Through Certificate of Need. An Overview, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 8 (1978) for an analysis of the Act.
75. Among the significant functions formerly performed through the
state executive branch were the following:
By the health systems agencies - review and approval of each
proposed use within the health systems area of Federal funds
appropriated under the Public Health Service Act, the Community
Mental Health Centers Act, or the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse
and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of
1970 for grants, contracts, loans or loan guarantees for the
development, expansion or support of health resources.
By the Statewide Health Coordinating Council - annual review and
approval or disapproval of any state plan and of any application
submitted to the Secretary as a condition to the receipt of any funds
under allotments made to states under the aforementioned acts.
76. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225.
(a) Any state which -
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the Act, the so-called "Pell Amendment," 77 however, Rhode Island,
uniquely defined by virtue of its lack of county or municipal health
departments and by its pre-existing substantially compliant
health planning system, was neither required to establish a health
service area nor to designate a health systems agency separate
from the State agency. In addition, the Governor of the State had
sole appointment power over the Statewide Health Coordinating
Council.
This unique situation, though applauded by Rhode Island
government officials and envied by governors of states across the
nation, was not necessarily greeted with enthusiasm by local
voluntary planning bodies and consumer activists. To them, the
"Pell Amendment" represented a piece of special interest
legislation which strengthened the already significant control of
Rhode Island state government over the health care system and
undercut the substantial direct consumer emphasis mandated in
virtually every other state. 78
Recognizing that the effects of the "Pell Amendment" in
Rhode Island were not fully supported by significant other parties,
including the Federal Department of HEW, and further
(1) has no county or municipal public health institution or
department, and
(2) has, prior to the date of enactment of this title, maintained
a health planning system which substantially complies with the
purposes of this title, and the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust
Territories in the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa shall
each be considered in accordance with subsection (b) to be a
State for purposes of this title.
(b) In the case of an entity which under subsection (a) is to be
considered a State for purposes of this title -
(1) no health service area shall be established within it,
(2) no health systems agency shall be designated for it,
(3) the State Agency designated for it under section 1521 may,
in addition to the functions prescribed by section 1523, perform
the functions prescribed by section 1513 and shall be eligible to
receive grants authorized by sections 1516 and 1640, and
(4) the chief executive officer shall appoint the Statewide
Health Coordinating Council prescribed by section 1524 in
accordance with the regulation of the Secretary.
77. Named after Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island who proposed
the amendment.
78. Only Hawaii and the District of Columbia were similarly designated.
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recognizing that the state agency was compelled to have in place
an administrative program to effectuate the purposes of the Act
within stipulated time frames in order to guarantee eventual
designation under the Act and the continued flow of federal health
care dollars into the state, the agency set out to secure passage of
a compliant certificate-of-need law, 79 the only aspect of the
mandatory state administrative program which could not be
accomplished by means other than statutory enactment.
The Rhode Island law, as it was constituted in 1975, covered
hospitals, nursing homes, and certain types of prepaid group
practices, but it had to be amended to include the full range of
health facilities likely to be included by the Federal government in
its implementing regulations. It was the further understanding of
the state agency that a compliant program had to be implemented
not later than the expiration of the first regular legislative session
of the state, which commenced after January 4, 1975.
It was at this juncture that the next stage of Rhode Island's
certificate-of-need history began - the great debate among the
health department, HARI and Blue Cross over the next iteration
of the certificate-of-need program for Rhode Island - a debate that
would consume the legislative sessions from 1975 through 1978 -
culminating in a certificate-of-need law that would pass initial
muster against the template set forth in the NHPRDA.
In attempting to secure passage of the legislation, the major
point of emphasis throughout the process was the fact that,
consistent with the carrot-stick approach adopted by the Federal
government in many other areas, failure to adopt a compliant law
by the federally mandated deadline could result in the loss of up to
$2.5 million annually by the State of Rhode Island and, more
importantly, failure to qualify for the waiver provisions afforded
by the earlier referenced "Pell Amendment." It appeared that the
79. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-1 (1974) provides that the state agency shall
administer a State certificate of need program which applies to new
institutional health services proposed to be offered or developed within the
State and which is satisfactory to the Secretary. Such program shall provide
for review and determination of need prior to the time such services, facilities
and organizations are offered or developed or substantial expenditures are
undertaken in preparation for such offering or development and provide that
only those services, facilities, and organizations found to be needed shall be
offered or developed in the State.
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potential loss of Federal funds and state control would be an
unbeatable selling point in combination. The next four legislative
sessions would prove, however, that it was somewhat more
complicated an endeavor than originally contemplated.
Accordingly, the years 1975 through 1978 were marked
primarily by the Health Department's efforts to secure passage of
such a law, to correct some of the problems noted during the early
years of the state's experience with its own certificate-of-need law,
and to satisfy, to the extent possible, conflicting interests of
numerous other parties.
A. 1975
Part of the Department's strategy in introducing a bill at all
in 1975 was to begin to get the General Assembly to consider
broadening the certificate-of-need legislation. In the absence of
the federal regulations, the state really had very little guidance in
terms of the necessary substance of the bill, and attempted to
counter the lack of information with sufficiently vague language to
allow for eventual conformance through the agency's regulations,
a much easier task than that involved in shepherding extremely
detailed and complicated legislation through the General
Assembly.
The bill, 75-H-6230, bore a great resemblance to the type of
tinkering legislation in which the Department, on the advice of its
legal counsel, appeared to specialize prior to 1976.80 It merely
attempted, through the modification of a couple of passages in the
existing statute, to broaden its scope of coverage from one
pertaining to hospitals and pre-paid group practices to one
encompassing all types of health care facilities. 81 The bill also
attempted to expand coverage from exclusive concern with
substantial construction and acquisition of high cost equipment to
encompass initiation, expansion and modification of health care
services and programs. 82
The proposed extension of jurisdiction to all health services
facilities essentially served as a protectionist device since it sought
to impose control over the laboratories, surgicenters and other
80. See generally 75-H 6230, Jan. 1975 Sess. (R.I. 1975).
81. See generally id.
82. See generally id.
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similar centers accused of "cream-skimming" by the hospitals. On
the other hand, there was a hope that the scope of such control
could eventually add a new dimension of rationality to the system
if the regulators were able to operate without the hindrance of
vested interests. The potential would finally exist for movement
away from average cost reimbursement to a more rational
service-determined cost to allow hospitals to compete with the
more cost effective mechanisms if they so chose. By changing the
regulatory focus to invite hospitals to terminate losing services
rather than impose unilateral barriers to entry, to preclude
inclusion of plant assets used for rendering non-remunerated
services from being figured in the rate base (as Blue Cross, the
Health Planning Council and the Health Services Council were
attempting to do in their review of underutilized facilities) and to
insist that hospitals adopt accounting procedures designed to
reveal the true costs of serving various classes of customers, it was
hoped the public could be much better served. Expansion of
jurisdiction to include all health-related facilities would guarantee
that the statewide planning system would be all-inclusive and,
together with Blue Cross postulating a "maxicap" for the hospitals
for 1975-1976 of approximately 9% coupled with a reduction in
utilization of up to 4%, promised to be an effective model for cost
containment. Such at least was the plan.
Introduced as an administration bill late in the session, 75-H-
6230 was apparently doomed from its inception, perhaps
fortunately so, since its passage would not have obviated the need
to introduce additional amendments in succeeding sessions merely
to resolve the procedural deficiencies evident in comparison with
the eventual federal regulations. As it turns out, the bill was
never reported out of committee. Instead, a special interest bill,
75-H-5906, introduced on behalf of a single small hospital that
was adversely affected by the sliding budget-related thresholds
triggering review in the agency's implementing regulation, was
enacted with the support of HARI, which feared the Department's
proposed extension of authority into programs. Thus, all
hospitals, regardless of budget, were placed on even keel with
respect to the imposition of controls by the state on new
construction or equipment - there would be no review of
construction or equipment acquisition of less than $100,000 in cost
and, at least as of the end of the 1975 legislative session, no
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extension of control to other health care facilities.
B. 1976
The message accompanying the Health Department's 1976
proposal 83 again argued that legislation had to be passed in the
1976 session and that failure to do so could result in the potential
for loss of funds and state control.84 HARI, which was supportive
of some extension of the Department of Health's jurisdiction,
strenuously expressed its opposition to the Health Department
proposal.
The March 29, 1976 testimony of HARI, which was
distributed to all members of the General Assembly, not only
argued that the Department bill was premature but, in particular,
expressed concern about the "enormous extension of the
regulatory and control powers of the Department" and away from
the boards and professional staffs of voluntary agencies and
providers.85 HARI did acknowledge its support for extension of
certificate-of-need authority to free-standing clinics, centers for
diagnostic or therapeutic radiology, hemodialysis, computer
assisted tomography and surgery, but limited its support to
capital expenditure review alone. This testimony was one of the
first articulations of HARI's position that hospitals were
disadvantaged by certificate-of-need controls that did not extend
to hospital competitors.
In response, on May 10, 1976, the Department circulated its
first direct statement on the cost containment potential of
certificate-of-need as it had existed prior to that time to the
members of the General Assembly. 86  The substance of the
memorandum was a comparison of: (1) the operating budgets of
the voluntary hospitals over the period 1966 through 1976; (2) the
total of approved capital expenditures for hospitals for the period
83. 76-H 7797, Jan. 1976 Sess. (R.I. 1976).
84. Letter from Joseph E. Cannon, Former Dir. of the R.I. Dep't of
Health, to Clifford J. Cawley, Jr., Chairman, Judiciary Comm., H.R. (Apr. 2,
1976) (on file with author).
85. Health Care Facility Licensing and Health Resources Approval Act of
R.I: Hearing on 76-H 7797 (1976) (testimony of Hosp. Ass'n of R.I.) (on file
with author).
86. R.I. DEP'T HEALTH, FACT SHEET: THE NEED FOR HEALTH RESOURCE
REGULATION, 76-H 7797, 1976 Sess. (1976) (on file with author).
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1971 through 1976; (3) the associated annualized costs of those
capital expenditures; and (4) the associated annualized costs of
hospital programs approved through the voluntary health
planning process.87
The memorandum concluded that only $1.5 million or .65% of
the $222.5 million authorized for fiscal year 1976 hospital
operating budgets was attributable to authorized expenditures
subject to the capital expenditure regulatory review of the
Department of Health and actually implemented as of 1976.88
The memorandum also showed that review of new programs had a
far greater cost containment potential since the aggregate impact
on costs of programs approved through the voluntary planning
process in the period from 1973 to 1976 represented nearly 10% of
the 1976 annual operating budgets of the hospitals.89
Thus, this simplistic analysis attempted to underscore the
need for program review as an important adjunct to capital
expenditure review if cost containment was to ever be achieved.
However, HARI's arguments on prematurity, overregulation of the
hospital industry and greater need for controls over other
providers than over hospital programmatic expenditures seemed
to be prevailing.
In an effort to salvage something from the session, the
legislative members of the Health Services Council, John
McFarland and Bruce Daniel, amended a resolution that was
sitting in the House Committee on Health, Education and Welfare
to create a special legislative commission. 90 Its purpose was to
study all health care delivery service regulations and statutes,
recommend any changes deemed necessary and to report to the
General Assembly by March 1, 1977.91 Thus, the 1976 legislative





90. R.I. Acts & Resolves 180.
91. Id. at 180-81.
151
152 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:127
C. 1977
By 1977, HARI and the Health Department were back on the
same team, but serious tension developed between the
Department of Health and HARI on the one hand, and Blue Cross
of Rhode Island and the State Budget Office, on the other. This
was dramatically underscored by the fight within the General
Assembly over two sentences in the Department's new legislation,
77-H-6120.92 Those two sentences read as follows:
Reasonable costs associated with offering or developing
new institutional health services or new health care
equipment approved under this chapter shall be deemed
to constitute new costs for purposes of reimbursement.
Nothing in the preceding sentence, however, shall be
construed to mandate the reimbursement of all
previously existing or other proposed new costs of a
health care facility. 93
The third-party purchasers opposed inclusion of those sentences in
the legislation because they insisted that the final say on funding
new programs that went through the certificate-of-need process
had to rest with the budget negotiators at the budget table and
not with the Health Department. 94
Interestingly the same two sentences had not been opposed
the prior year when they had been included in 76-H-7797,95 which
died in committee because of HARI's opposition to programmatic
review but not because of the two sentences.
At the time of the 1977 legislative testimony on the issue of
these two sentences, the hospitals and third party payors were
nearing completion of the three-year prospective budgeting and
reimbursement experiment that they had embarked upon with the
Medicare program, and were contemplating a revised two-year
92. 77-H 6120, Apr. 1977 Sess. (R.I. 1977).
93. Id. (quoting proposed amendment to R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-
4(c)(15)(g)).
94. Health Care Certificate-of-Need Act of R.I.: Hearing on 77-H 6120A
Before the S. HEW Comm. (1977) (testimony of Hosp. Ass'n of R.I.) (on file
with author).
95. 76-H 7797, Jan. 1976 Sess. (R.I. 1976).
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extension. While the program had achieved cost containment
objectives, the hospitals felt strongly that too much had been cut
at the budget table from the service changes, innovations and
capital projects areas of the budgets because such costs (not
having yet been incurred) were easier to reduce than the tougher
but necessary cost-cutting decisions to be made in the existing
budgets of the hospitals. 96
Also reiterated in the 1977 testimony was a repeat of HARI's
1976 articulation of the hospitals' long standing support of
certificate-of-need and the planning process in Rhode Island.97
Ultimately, Blue Cross and the State Budget Office prevailed in
their arguments and the legislation was vetoed by the Governor.
D. 1978
Finally, in June 1978, the state enacted a certificate-of-need
law that it believed could comply with the requirements of the
NHPRDA.98 Within months of the law's passage, however, there
was internal friction within the Department.
Discord was apparent as early as December 1978, when the
96. Health Care Certificate-of-Need Act of R.L: Hearing on 77-H 6120A
Before the S. HEW Comm. (1977) (testimony of Hosp. Ass'n of R.I.) (on file
with author).
97. Id.
98. See generally 1978 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 269. The 1978 law covered
hospitals, skilled nursing and intermediate care facilities, home health
agencies, clinical laboratories, rehabilitation centers, kidney disease
treatment centers, health maintenance organizations, free standing
emergency care facilities, surgicenters, and organized ambulatory care
facilities unless such organized ambulatory care facilities were owned and
operated by professional service corporations. Id. The only other exemption
was for private practitioners (except for new health care equipment exceeding
$150,000 in capital costs). Id.
These entities were required to secure state approval for
establishment of new health care facilities; new capital expenditures
exceeding $150,000; increases in licensed bed capacity; new and substantial
health services as defined in regulations, and capital expenditures for new
health care equipment exceeding $150,000.
Offering or developing the foregoing services without review by
Health Services Council and approval by the Department of Health would
subject the facility to licensure sanctions or reimbursement denials by
Medicaid or Blue Cross. Going forward after disapproval would place the
facility in jeopardy of losing future federal or state grant funds. Approvals by
the Department of Health could be subject to conditions but only conditions
incorporated in regulations promulgated by the Department.
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Deputy Director of the Department, in a memo expressing fear
that the state agency would be forced to apply controls equally
against facilities it wished to promote and facilities it wished to
retard and arguing against extension of certificate of need to
non-hospital facilities, described certificate-of-need as a
mechanism for cost containment among other alleged attributes. 99
This elicited a response from the certificate-of-need staff that
demonstrated the staffs lack of delusion on this score. In
summary, the argument went as follows: In the area of cost
containment, certificate-of-need had some cost avoidance effects to
the extent that additional inpatient beds were not built and that
financing mechanisms taking advantage of equity and/or tax
exempt bonding came into play. However, staff noted the high
approval rate of the process, the fact that, in Rhode Island, there
was virtually no concrete evidence of abandonment of plans by
hospitals because of the existence of the process (the so-called
"deterrence effect"), and that capital investment in equipment and
beds seemed to be replacing new construction. Accordingly, staff
felt that the hidden costs of certificate-of-need, reflected in the
preservation of hospitals, which should perhaps have been
eliminated had new competing hospitals been allowed into the
system during the ten years since passage of certificate-of-need,
probably outweighed the cost savings.100
The staff memorandum noted that certificate-of-need had
been but one recommendation of the Brosco Commission to resolve
the financial difficulties of hospitals, but that the state's
prospective reimbursement experiment probably had had more to
do with any alleviation that had taken place, citing the 1976
evidence that certificate-of-need had meant little in terms of
impact on hospital budgets.101
In arguing for maintaining control over all health care
facilities, the staff memorandum concluded that certificate-of-need
had protected hospitals and the hospitals hoped that extension of
certificate-of-need to health care facilities other than hospitals
99. Memorandum from John Tierney to Gerry Goulet (Dec. 18, 1978) (on
file with author).
100. Memorandum from Gerry Goulet to John Tierney (Dec. 25, 1978) (on
file with author).
101. R.I. DEP'T HEALTH, FACT SHEET: THE NEED FOR HEALTH RESOURCE
REGULATION, 76-H 7797, 1976 Sess. (1976) (on file with author).
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would continue to protect the markets of hospitals. It suggested
that it was up to the agency to assure that such was not the case.
Repeal of certificate-of-need over certain types of health care
facilities might be one solution, it posited, but preservation of
flexibility in the certificate-of-need decision making process was
most certainly another.102
The arguments expressed in the dueling memos were those of
the planners against those of the regulators. The planners saw
certificate-of-need as a planning tool targeted against certain
providers to contain costs, improve accessibility, assure quality
and rationalize the system. The regulators were much more
realistic about the cost containment limitations of an exclusively
reactive process, but believed they could make reasoned
distinctions in evaluating capital projects and new programs of
hospitals and nursing homes compared to capital projects and new
programs of other types of health care facilities. The planners
were concerned that the extension of certificate-of-need to
non-hospital ambulatory care facilities would result in denials of
such proposals even if the Department wished to favor them. This
concern stemmed from the planners' not unreasonable belief that
regulators would be required to sacrifice distinctions presented by
individual cases in order assure to equal procedural treatment of
applicants. The upshot of the memorandum exchange was that
certain categories of non-hospital organized ambulatory care
facilities were delayed from inclusion within the certificate-of-need
law's coverage in the first set of regulations promulgated in
1979.103
The law underwent another set of changes in 1980, in order to
conform its provisions to the latest procedural changes in the
Federal regulations,104 to eliminate clinical laboratories 05 and to
delay organized ambulatory care facilities from inclusion until
mid-1981. This resulted in the promulgation of the 1981
102. Memorandum from John Tierney to Gerry Goulet (Dec. 18, 1978) (on
file with author).
103. R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULEs AND REGS. FOR DETERMINATION OF NEED
FOR NEW HEALTH CARE EQUIP. AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL HEALTH SERVS. (1979)
(on file with author).
104. 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 288-306.
105. 1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 322.
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amendment to the state regulations.106
In 1981, the Department's continuing debate over the scope of
the certificate-of- need law,' 07 with the regulators now teaming up
with the planners, culminated in a legislative proposal to repeal
certificate-of-need over various types of facilities, an action that
was strenuously and successfully opposed by South County
Hospital and HARI. Thus, by the end of 1981, the dream of
covering all health care facilities and of rationalizing the system
through the certificate-of-need process had already begun to give
way to more modest goals.
E. 1982: The Big Year
The year 1982 was, in many ways, a watershed year for the
certificate-of-need program. Certificate-of-need made its way into
a scholarly journal; the Department reviewed its most significant
hospital capital project to that time; and, at least in part, as a
result of the latter, the General Assembly initiated the process of
fashioning legislation to more closely align the capital review and
hospital budgeting and reimbursement processes.
In June 1982, three of the Department's senior staff wrote
what appears to have been the first published defense of Rhode
Island's certificate-of-need program. 108  Citing the extensive,
mostly negative, literature that had been authored in previous
years regarding the effectiveness of certificate-of-need,
particularly its apparent lack of success in controlling health care
costs, 109 the authors shifted gears and argued that the Rhode
Island program was having a positive effect in three areas that
were rarely measured in the literature: deterrence, guidance and
institutional planning.110
106. R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, RULES AND REGS. FOR DETERMINATION OF NEED
FOR NEW HEALTH CARE EQUIP. AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL HEALTH SERVS. (1981)
(amending the 1979 version) (on file with author).
107. Memorandum from Gerard R. Goulet to Health Services Council re:
Proposed Repeal of Certificate-of-Need over free standing emergency rooms,
ambulatory care facilities and home health agencies (Feb. 27, 1981) (on file
with author).
108. John T. Tierney, William J. Waters & William H. Rosenberg,
Certificate-of-Need-No Panacea but Not Without Merit, 3 J. OF PUB. HEALTH
POL'Y 178, 178 (1982).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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The deterrence argument was familiar. Institutions were
unlikely to spend the time, energy and money to navigate the
complicated certificate-of-need process for a frivolous or obviously
misdirected project. While this argument had largely been
anecdotal in previous iterations, the authors attempted to validate
the premise by citing research comparing hospital bed supply and
physician supply in the state from 1956-1980. Their underlying
theory was that, in the absence of certificate-of-need, one would
have expected the hospital bed supply to expand commensurate
with the expanding supply of practicing physicians.111 Instead,
beds per physician declined from 2.1 in 1958 to 1.5 in 1980.112
Thus, the authors concluded that had certificate-of-need over
hospitals not existed, Rhode Island would have had 300 more
hospital beds in 1980.113
A second line of argument was that, while overall hospital
investment did not appear to be reduced by certificate-of-need, the
program may have had a positive impact on the types of
investments hospitals were making.114  Citing the program's
promotion of: (1) "the utilization of tax-exempt bonds where
appropriate," (2) "the pursuit of community fund drives as a
source of financing capital expenditures," and (3) "the employment
of debt/equity ratio limitations" as evidence, the authors suggested
that hospital adoption of any or all of the above in Rhode Island
was more likely to have been attributable to certificate-of-need
than to any other influence.115 They also pointed to the relatively
slow dispersion of CAT scanners in Rhode Island in comparison
with the experience in other states as evidence of the influence of
certificate-of-need in restraining the introduction of new
technology.116
For their third argument, the authors asserted that
111. Id. at 179.
112. Id.
113. Id. Of course, the exact same effect could have been achieved had the
state simply adopted a moratorium on licensing new hospital beds similar to
the moratorium on licensing new nursing home beds that the nursing home
industry succeeded in getting enacted in 1996. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-44
(2008). In the thirteen years since that law was first enacted, certificate-of-
need has been more theoretical than real for nursing homes.
114. Tierney, supra note 108, at 179.
115. Id. at 180.
116. Id.
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"certificate-of-needs tend to promote better institutional
planning."117 While there was little evidence that the quality of
the annual long and short range plans of the individual hospitals
were any better than they had been before certificate-of-need, the
authors cited significant inter-institutional planning involving
nine of the state's hospitals over the prior ten years.118
Presumably, it was to be inferred that, in the absence of
institutional planning, inter-institutional planning could not
possibly exist. Each of these effects is difficult, if not impossible,
to measure, but if they did exist, they provided some explanation
why the program should continue to exist despite its lack of
denials. The authors closed with an argument for a capital
expenditure limit - recommending that financial boundaries be
established to limit the dollars and, by extension, the number of
certificate-of-need proposals that could be approved in a given
timeframe through application of a replicable priority setting
process.119
As this Essay was going to print, Women & Infants Hospital
was presenting the Department of Health with the largest capital
expenditure proposal in the history of certificate-of-need to that
point in time. On January 1, 1982, the Hospital had submitted an
application to relocate and construct a replacement facility on the
campus of the Rhode Island Hospital - a proposal to which Roger
Williams Hospital objected.120 Six years before, in the context of
an earlier certificate-of-need approval to renovate its then existing
physical plant, the Health Services Council had expressed its
opinion that Women & Infants Hospital should affiliate with a




119. Id. at 181.
120. A major focus of the application was whether the hospital should
renovate at its existing location and affiliate with Roger Williams Hospital or
whether it should relocate to the Rhode Island Hospital campus and affiliate
with that institution.
121. "As a final consideration, it is a finding of the Committee that
completion of this final phase of renovation constitutes the conclusion of
capital development proposals at the existing physical plant of the Women &
Infants Hospital. Accordingly, any proposal to undertake additional capital
programs within the existing physical plant beyond that already initiated or
herein authorized, other [sic] that for relief of a documented emergency
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During the 1982 review, the Department of Health asked the
State Auditor General to conduct a comparison of the two options
for relocation/affiliation. 122 After review of the application, the
Health Services Council favored the move to the Rhode Island
Hospital campus, but found Women & Infants' proposed method of
financing to be too expensive. 123 It therefore recommended denial
of the application without prejudice to the presentation of a
modification to the proposed method of financing.124 The Director
of Health adopted the Council's recommendation on December 23,
1982.125 Within a three-month timeframe, the Hospital requested
reconsideration, was denied, and requested an adjudicative public
hearing.126 This was continued pending action on the Hospital's
concurrent request for remand to the Health Department on the
basis of new, "'significant relevant information not previously
considered by the [state agency]."' 127 On March 29, 1983, "the
adjudication officer remanded the application to the state agency
'for consideration of the new information set forth in [the Remand
Order]."' 128 This new information was considered at four separate
situation, will be viewed by the Health Services Council as unwarranted from
the community perspective considering the scarcity of capital resources and
the limited useful life attendant upon any future [development]." RHODE
ISLAND HEALTH SERVS. COUNCIL, REPORT ON WOMAN & INFANTS HosP.
PROPOSAL (Jan. 12, 1977) (on file with author).
122. See generally R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF
THE HEALTH SERVS. COUNCIL ON THE WOMEN & INFANTS HosP. PROPOSAL FOR





127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 3. The relevant portions of the remand points are set forth as
follows:
(1) WIH has, together with those other hospitals in Rhode Island
having obstetric services, begun to assume a leadership role in the
integrated planning of perinatal care services throughout Rhode
Island. The intent of the hospitals' efforts, spearheaded by WIH, is to
establish appropriate roles and responsibilities among the region's
hospitals in the context of a regional perinatal system. At the
hospitals' meeting on February 22, 1983, ... WIH was identified as
the tertiary perinatal center for the State of Rhode Island. Also at
the meeting, consensus was reached that a regional approach to
perinatal referrals within the State of Rhode Island should be
developed immediately. The Chairman of the Perinatal Committee of
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the Medical Society volunteered to draft a referral plan. That task is
in process, and additional meetings of the participating hospitals are
planned. WIH's efforts in furtherance of regional perinatal planning
underscore the Hospital's previously stated commitment to the
regional planning process and to the quality of care and cost benefits
attendant thereto. WIH requests specific state authorization to
continue with its planning efforts.
(2) WIH will not, at this time, seek the 3 bassinet increase in its
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit capacity it had requested in its CON
application.
(3) WIH has resolved ... to establish a modern "alternative birthing
center" within its proposed facility design and/or proximate to the
WIH. Implementation will commence at the earliest possible time
based on the results of a study now in process, provided that
adequate third-party reimbursement can be assured.
(4) The Hospital has recently reaffirmed its commitment to early
maternity discharge and follow-up home health care. It is hoped
that these two programs, coupled with the implementation of an
alternative birthing center, will reduce the demand on the Hospital's
obstetrics service and thereby enable the Hospital to reduce its
obstetrical bed complement by as many as five beds. On this basis,
the Hospital hereby proposes to reduce the obstetrical bed
component of its proposed facility by five beds, thereby emphasizing
its support of regional obstetrical services, statewide bed reduction
efforts, and cost containment goals.
(5) Insofar as is otherwise financially prudent and feasible, given the
"Murray Plan" constraints (including those regarding future capital
budgeting by the applicant), WIH will . . . set aside one-half million
dollars of existing endowment plus 50% of any monies raised net of
expenses in excess of five million dollars ($5,000,000) through its
capital funds drive, the future income of which is to be utilized for
the provision of primary prevention services to low income residents
of WIH's proposed service area.
(6) Through additional refinements to its project plans, the Hospital
is seeking, and hereby commits, to reallocate space and reduce
square footage to achieve a reduction in the size of its proposed
project equivalent to 10,000 gross square feet -- at an average cost of
$125 per square foot -- or $1.25 million (average cost as identified in
the Lammers and Gershon Study). The project cost, estimated in
June, 1982 as $34 million is now, as a result of project inflation
during an estimated eight month construction delay, increased to
$36,909,999. The reduction of $1.25 million from this cost will result
in a total project construction cost of $35.7 million, provided,
however, that if an alternative birthing center is incorporated into
the proposed facility, the cost of that facility would have to be
adjusted accordingly.
(7) WIH is now committed to additional annual operating savings at
its new facility of $250,000, or a total of $750,000, such saving to be
accomplished through further reductions in FTE's and other
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services, and to become effective in accordance with and pursuant to
the financial plan agreed upon with the third-party payors. The
savings are a product of recently completed discussions with Blue
Cross concerning the so-called "Murray Plan."
(8) Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Rhode Island, the primary payor for
WIH's patient population, has endorsed the "Murray Plan" for
financing of the proposed project, specifically stating that the plan is
financially feasible. Blue Cross' recent endorsement of the Model as
a viable financing mechanism for this project paves the way for an
effective "bond life" cost savings, when compared to conventional
financing, of approximately $53.5 million for the project --
representing a reduction in financing costs from more than $83
million to approximately $29.5 million.
(9) WIH has resolved . . . to join with Rhode Island Hospital
(hereinafter "RIH") to study and seek to refine future capital
development plans for the RIH campus as they relate to activities
involving maternal and child health care. This commitment to joint
planning on the RIH campus serves as an additional illustration of
WIH'S efforts to minimize potentially unnecessary and costly
duplications on the RIH campus and to maximize the integration of
WIH and RIH perinatal services.
(10) In an attempt to create the single, unified organizational
structure proposed by the Health Services Council in its report, the
Hospital commits to the following program planning as part of its
affiliation structure at the RIH campus. This joint planning will
result in present and future program integrations to reduce program
duplication now and in the future. This approach encompasses the
following:
(A) The Trustee Affiliation Committee (TAC) of Women &
Infants Hospital (WIH) and Rhode Island Hospital (RIH) shall
be a signatory on all joint WIH-RIH certificate of need (CON)
applications. Each WIH-CON application shall be accompanied
by a written recommendation from the TAC as to approval or
disapproval of the application.
(B) The board of trustees of each hospital shall be a signatory
on joint WIH-RIH submissions of short and long range plans
(SLPs) to the Department henceforth. All WIH submissions of
SLPs to the Department shall be accompanied by a written
recommendation from the TAC as to approval or disapproval of
each of the short and long range plans (Proposed Institutional
Programs-PIPs). Said recommendation shall explicitly identify
any plan (PIP) of which the TAC does not approve.
(C) The TAC shall review and make written recommendations
as to approval or disapproval of the annual capital budgets and
new program budgets of WIH.
(D) In accordance with their Trustee Affiliation Agreement,
Women & Infants Hospital and Rhode Island Hospital plan to
have single clinical chiefs for the departments of OB/GYN,
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meetings over the course of the succeeding six weeks, at the last of
which the Hospital requested the Health Services Council to
accept the eleven points of the remand petition as an amendment
to the application.129 The Council did so on May 17, 1983, and its
action was adopted by the Director of Health on May 20, 1983.130
In its initial consideration of the Hospital's application, the
Health Services Council had been troubled by a number of issues,
including: (1) a failure of other hospitals providing obstetrics care
to designate Women & Infants as the only tertiary facility in the
state; (2) failure of the Hospital to pay sufficient attention to
shortening the length of stay for obstetrics patients; (3) failure of
the Hospital to consider alternative birthing centers; (4)
insufficient integration with Rhode Island Hospital to achieve
meaningful economies; (5) failure of the Hospital to emphasize
prevention; (6) lack of a master plan for development of the Rhode
Island Hospital campus; (7) excessive obstetrics and neonatal
intensive care space; (8) lack of compatibility with
recommendations of the Auditor General; and (9) excessive
Medicine, Psychiatry and Surgery. In addition, the WIH/RIH
Trustee Affiliation Agreement provides for joint planning in
those departments that do not have a single chief. Those
departments---namely, Pediatrics, Radiology, Pathology and
Anesthesia -- reflect unique and distinctly separate foci and
resource needs in the two hospitals due to Women & Infants
Hospital's primarily perinatal focus. The TAC shall,
nevertheless, make provision for these departments to conduct
joint program planning through the auspices of a standing
subcommittee of the affiliation Review Committee.
(11) WIH agrees, beginning in the fourth year of occupancy of its
proposed facility, to conduct a feasibility study with respect to the
establishment of a new and separate corporate entity for the purpose
of planning future capital development on the RIH campus. The
study shall address, among other things, an examination and
analysis of the operating and administrative experience of the
project as well as current financial, legal and other related aspects of
the project. The results of such study shall be disseminated to the
Department. Id. at A-1 to A-8.
Of course, points nine through eleven were effectively rendered moot
when in 1997 Woman & Infants Hospital joined Care New England,
the rival health system to Lifespan, with which Rhode Island
Hospital had affiliated in 1994.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id. at 5.
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interest cost associated with the proposed method of financing.131
The move to the Rhode Island Hospital campus was
eventually favored over the proposal to remain in place and
affiliate with Roger Williams Hospital for several reasons: (1) the
life-cycle cost of a new facility under the "Murray" financing plan
was only slightly more than renovating and updating Women &
Infants' existing facility; (2) the latter proposal would only have a
useful life of ten to fifteen years in comparison to thirty years for a
new facility; (3) Rhode Island Hospital had services and facilities
which would require development by any other hospital with
which Women & Infants might contemplate affiliating; (4) on a
practical level, Women & Infants had insufficient access to capital
to fund its own renovation, and potential affiliation partners other
than Rhode Island Hospital were only able to raise capital for
their own needs.132 Finally, architectural consultants engaged by
the Department of Health found the Women & Infants' existing
facility to be functionally obsolete and deserving of
abandonment. 133
Although the path to this conclusion was particularly tortuous
because of both the need to modify the application, rather than
merely fashion conditions, and the effort to over-document the
record in order to stave off further court proceedings, the Women
& Infants 1983 decision was a precursor to the detailed
conditional approval process that was ushered in some twenty
years later with yet another Women & Infants application and
that continues to date. While some saw the failure to deny the
application outright as a missed savings opportunity, adoption of
the modified financing plan was in itself associated with
significant savings over virtually any other practical alternative
considered.
The original proposal would have increased Blue Cross
premium rates by 1.67%.134 A minimum renovation would have
increased Blue Cross premium rates by .29%.135 The modified
proposal would increase Blue Cross premium rates by .75%, an
incremental increase of only .46% above a minimum
131. See generally id.
132. See generally id.
133. See generally id.
134. See generally id.
135. See generally id.
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renovation. 136  This review underscored the minimal cost
containment impact of capital expenditure review that had been
first discussed in 1976.137 This had been a massive capital
expenditure program by Rhode Island certificate-of-need
standards. Yet, its cost impact at its worst was barely 1.5% in
Blue Cross premiums or $15 on every $1,000.138 Such a modest
cost to replace an entire hospital provides some indication of the
relative insignificance of new capital cost control to the overall
cost of health care services in general, and of hospital services in
particular. Nevertheless, the scope of this proposal was no small
factor in launching the next major phase of the certificate-of-need
process: that associated with the "CONCAP" years. 13 9
In the 1982 session, the General Assembly enacted a Joint
Resolution Creating a Special Legislative Commission to Study
Health Care Capital Expenditures.140 Chaired by the chairman of
the House Committee on Health, Education and Welfare,
Representative Anthony J. Carcieri, the Commission sought to
integrate the certificate-of-need process with that of the
prospective reimbursement process - a goal that had actually been
articulated by HARI representatives in 1979.141 But, the genesis
of the concept actually stemmed from an April 29, 1977 letter from
Fred Burdett, Chief of Medical Care Standards, the division
within state government that was responsible for the certificate-
of-need process, to Paul Carvisiglia, Executive Director of the
voluntary Health Planning Council. 142
136. See generally id.
137. See generally id.
138. See generally id.
139. The CONCAP was the maximum annual aggregate increase in
interest and depreciation costs determined by negotiation among the state
budget office, Blue Cross of Rhode Island and HARI. All certificate-of-need
approvals for a given year had to fit within this negotiated ceiling.
140. 1982 R.I. Acts & Resolves 359.
141. See generally R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF
THE HEALTH SERVS. COUNCIL ON THE WOMEN & INFANTS HosP. PROPOSAL FOR
AFFILIATION AND RELOCATION (1983) (on file with author).
142. Letter from Fred Burdett, Chief, Medical Care Standards, R.I. Dep't
of Health, to Paul Carvisiglia, Exec. Dir., R.I. Health Planning Council, Inc.
(Apr. 29, 1977) (on file with author). The letter advised Mr. Carvisiglia that
the Health Services Council ("HSC") had adopted a policy three days earlier
that stipulated that actions taken by the HSC after May 1, 1977, would take
into account the aggregate of proposals before the Council in order to
determine the availability of resources. Id. The mechanism was to "involve
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While the Commission was meeting, the General Assembly
was not standing still. In 1982, clinical laboratories were
inadvertently reintroduced as covered entities, 143  but
neighborhood health centers were eliminated from coverage by the
certificate-of-need program.144  In 1983, facilities providing
hospice care were added.145
In 1984, neighborhood health centers were restored in one
piece of legislation,146 but more importantly, the Health Care
System Affordability Act of 1984 was enacted.147 In addition to
again eliminating clinical laboratories from the scope of
certificate-of-need, this amendment provided for short-lived
coverage of program expansions,148 introduced the concept of the
cost impact analysis and of affordability, reduced the number of
annual application filings from two to one, and established the
"CONCAP" priority setting process. 149 The law also linked the
the establishment of an appropriate level of annual investment in capital
assets and the ranking of all proposals identified as implementation Category
I in the long and short range plans submitted by hospitals in terms of their
priority within the capital resource constraints established." Id.
Noting that this was merely a verbal affirmation of an effort the HSC
had advocated for a considerable period, Mr. Burdett also represented that he
had been asked by the HSC to "convene a meeting of interested and affected
agencies in order to discuss the feasibility of approximating an annual level
of capital investment or alternatively of establishing a maximum percentage
increment for capital expenditures within the framework of an overall
maximum percentage increment in total hospital expenditures." Id.
This concept is virtually indistinguishable from the "CONCAP" that
was to emerge from the Carcieri Commission's deliberations from 1982
through early January 1984.
143. 1982 R.I. Pub. Laws 958.
144. Id. at 1862, 1864.
145. 1983 R.I. Pub. Laws 339, 340.
146. 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 744, 746.
147. Health Care System Affordability Act of 1984, ch. 4, 1984 R.I. Pub.
Laws 7. The intent of the legislation was set forth in the preamble. "Now,
therefore, the general assembly, in furtherance of the public interest,
requires that health care program coordination among health care planning,
certificate of need review and provider reimbursement systems be improved
and that said three programs include consideration of affordability by the
people of the state." Id.
148. Id. at 9 (amending R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-15-2(j) by adding subsection
(6): "Major expansion of an existing program which increases operating
expenditures in a health care facility by one hundred fifty thousand dollars
($150,000) or more within one (1) year.").
149. Health Care System Affordability Act of 1984, ch. 4, 1984 R.I. Pub.
Laws 12, amending R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-15-4 by adding Section (e) thereto,
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certificate-of-need and reimbursement processes in a manner
nearly diametrically opposed to that which had been advanced in
the General Assembly battle of 1977.150
To further assure alignment of these processes, certain health
services council appointments were specifically assigned to
representatives of Blue Cross, Medicaid, the state budget office
the relevant language of which provided:
. . . [T]he health services council shall evaluate each proposal for
which a determination of need has been established in relation to
other such proposals, comparing proposals with each other, whether
similar or not establishing priorities among the proposals for which
need has been determined and taking into consideration the criteria
and standards relating to relative need and affordability as set forth
... herein.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-15-6 was also extensively amended by adding sections (f),(g), (h) and (i) thereto. See Health Care System Affordability Act of 1984, ch.
4, 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 13. These sections imposed an obligation on the state
budget office and Blue Cross of Rhode Island to file cost impact analyses with
the health services council that would address increases in operating
expenses, per diem rates, health care insurance premiums and public
expenditures as well as acceptability of interest rates and minimum equity
contributions/maximum debt. See Health Care System Affordability Act of
1984, at 13.
The CONCAP itself was the "maximum aggregate increase in interest
and depreciation costs associated with implementation of needed proposals
which can be afforded." See id. at 16. The performance of the state's economy
was to be one guideline in establishing the CONCAP and other hospital
operating expenses were to be another guideline. Id. at 16-17. It was a
number on which the State, Blue Cross and the hospitals, through HARI, had
to reach agreement (through mediation and arbitration, if necessary) by not
later than 270 days after initiation of the application process. Id. at 16. If
the parties failed to do so, no hospital project submitted in the review cycle
could be approved. Id.
The health services council's determination of affordability required
it to consider the condition of the state's economy, the statements of parties
affected by the proposals, and, in particular, for hospital proposals, whether
approval of a hospital proposal with a low priority ranking would cause the
maximum increase is interest and depreciation costs to be exceeded. Id. at
16-17. The council's determination remained independent in that it was free
to deem a hospital proposal with a low rank unaffordable notwithstanding
the fact that the CONCAP limit may not have been exceeded.
150. Id. at 13 (amending R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-15-4 (h) by adding the
following language: "Government agencies and hospital and medical service
corporations organized under the laws of the state shall during budget
negotiations hold health care facilities and health care providers accountable
to operating efficiencies claimed or projected in proposals which receive the
approval of the state agency in accordance with this chapter.").
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and the hospitals.15
Cost containment was the backdrop of the Health Care
System Affordability Act of 1984,152 and the value of certificate-of-
need on the basis of cost containment or other claims played itself
out in various publications both before and after the 1984 law's
enactment.
III. COST CONTAINMENT OR NOT?
The memorandum circulated to the General Assembly in May
of 1976 had been the only serious attempt to discuss the actual
cost containment experience of the pre-existing program during
the four years of legislative debate that accompanied the attempt
to enact a NHPRDA-compliant certificate-of-need law. The
statistics in that analysis supported the Department's position
that the capital expenditures avoided had been minimal in
comparison with the operating costs of the collective hospitals,
and that cost containment was unlikely to be achieved through
control of capital expenditures alone.153 By 1977, program review
seemed to be a permanent feature of each legislative package, and
cost containment appears to have been simply taken for granted
as a side effect of a complete program that would cover both new
capital expenditures and new programs that promised to
substantially increase operating expenses.
As if to lend further credence to that argument, four years
later, in 1980, agency staff attempted to replicate the methodology
employed in a 1979 study of the Massachusetts certificate-of-need
program that concluded that the benefits of that program were
outweighed by its costS.154  The Massachusetts study had
measured costs for: (1) application preparation, (2) application
fees, (3) costs of state government, (4) costs of health systems
agencies, and (5) inflation.155 Against these costs, the
151. 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 17.
152. See Health Care System Affordability Act of 1984, ch. 4, 1984 R.I.
Pub. Laws 13.
153. R.I. DEP'T HEALTH, FACT SHEET: THE NEED FOR HEALTH RESOURCE
REGULATION, 76-H 7797, 1976 Sess. (1976) (on file with author).
154. See generally HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., AN INQUIRY INTO THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DETERMINATION OF NEED PROGRAM (1979).
155. See id.
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Massachusetts study offset savings in capital costs from projects
denied and concluded that costs outstripped benefits.15 6
Rhode Island's agency staff found these measures to have
been too limiting, adding to them four additional categories: (1)
projects withdrawn, (2) project modifications, (3) operating cost
avoidance, and (4) interest cost savings.157 In contrast with the
Massachusetts study, the Rhode Island analysis calculated the
measurable benefits of Rhode Island's program for its first eight
years to have outweighed its costs by nearly (over atwenty year
period) $250 million when operating cost savings were
considered.158 Restricting the measure of savings to only capital
cost savings reduced that figure to $27 million, but it remained
positive.159 Thus, by expanding the criteria beyond simple project
denials, the Department felt that it had identified a truer measure
of the cost avoidance value of the program.160
This was expanded upon in an early 1982 response to a
request for information from the American Health Planning
Association.161 Three positive effects of certificate-of-need were
identified in that letter. The first was the Department's evidence
of a deterrent effect based on its analysis that the supply of
physicians was a good predictor of the supply of hospital beds
between 1954 and 1971 (R = .89).162 Analysis of the post-
certificate-of-need period (1971 - 1980) "show[ed] a weak, but
negative, relationship (R = -.33)."163 According to the
Department's analysis, "[h]ad the trend of 1954-1971 continued
through the [1970s,] there would have been 300-600 more hospital
beds in Rhode Island."164
The second argument for some measure of effectiveness of
certificate-of-need was derived from the Department's analysis of
156. Id.
157. See R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF MEDICAL CARE STANDARDS,
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CERTIFICATE OF NEED IN RHODE ISLAND 3 (1980) (on file
with author).
158. See id. at 3-5.
159. See id. at 5.
160. See id. at 3-5.
161. Letter from John T. Tierney, Deputy Director of R.I. Dep't of Health,
to Harry P. Cain II, Ph.D., Executive Dir. American Health Planning Ass'n
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the program's performance in conducting hospital reviews from
May 20, 1971, to February 1, 1982.165 During that time period,
the program "reviewed 79 hospital proposals having over $175
million in capital costs and over $30 million in associated annual
operating costs." 16 6 As a result of project denials, withdrawals or
modifications, the Department claimed $30 million in capital cost
savings and over $12 million in related operating cost savings.167
Finally, in a real leap of faith, the Department identified long-
and short-range plan estimates for hospitals in 1981 through 1983
of nearly $77 million.168 Since annual total capital expenditures
for hospitals had averaged $15-$20 million in the years prior to
1981, the Department suggested that, in the absence of certificate-
of-need, hospital capital expenditures could nearly double.169
Less than four months later, a couple of these points were
incorporated in the Department's first published defense of the
certificate-of-need program, but that defense actually emphasized
cost containment less and subjective benefits more. 170
It was not until 1986 that an outside criticism of the cost
containment failures of the Rhode Island program was
published.171 In this report, the author criticized the
Department's analyses of the early 1980's,172 the conclusions of
which had been largely based on early experiences characterized
by short review times and comparably favorable review flexibility
(e.g. no application format, no filing time frame, relatively small
delay related inflation costs). The author then used newer data
from 1980 to 1985 to demonstrate that, with few exceptions,
hospital proposals were approvedl 73 while the very result the






170. See generally Tierney, supra note 108.
171. See generally, Joseph M. Chazan, M.D., Certificate of Need: A
Concept Whose Time Has Passed, 69 RHODE ISLAND MED. J. 273 (June 1986).
172. Id. at 273-74.
173. Id. Of fifty-one hospital proposals reviewed from 1980 to 1985, forty-
eight were approved with capital costs of $122 million and only three were
denied with capital costs barely exceeding $3 million. Id. at 273.
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care facilities were subject to a significant denial rate.174 The
author also elaborated upon something that had never been
discussed in the earlier studies - the overstated nature of
apparent cost modifications and reductions attributed to the
program. 175 The author concluded that alternatives to hospital
care (e.g. outpatient surgical centers, dialysis centers, and
emergency rooms) should not be regulated and that even hospital
proposals that are not reimbursed on a charge or cost basis should
be unregulated since they are routinely approved anyway.176
It took nearly one year, but the Department of Health
responded to the 1986 publication with one of its own in the same
journal. 177 The analysis largely reiterated the subjective benefits
the Department had advanced in its 1982 publication, but in a
more detailed manner. The authors again referred to the
deterrent effect and argued that certificate-of-need had prevented
the unnecessary duplication of expensive capital expenditures. 178
The authors specifically highlighted in their analysis "that
roughly 33 per cent [sic] of the capital costs of CON applications
acted upon during the period 1971-1986 were not accepted,
withdrawn, modified, or denied."179  They also used as
corroboration that Rhode Island had a relatively modest hospital
bed supply of 3.7 acute-care community-hospital beds per 1000
population versus 4.4 for the United States. 80 However, in the
case of the former, it was a partial truth and, in the case of the
latter, it was irrelevant. The 33% figure was derived by
combining hospital and all other health care facility proposals.181
174. Id. at 275. Of sixty-three non-hospital proposals reviewed over the
same time frame, eighteen were denied or withdrawn, with thirteen of the
eighteen representing proposals by proprietary facilities to establish
alternatives to institutional care. Id.
175. Id. at 274. ("The reviewers, in order to satisfy the federal
government's need to document savings, demonstrate that they are in fact
'reducing' the project and 'saving' dollars. Thus, applicants who expect
proposals to be revised downward during the review process inflate their
original proposals to enable the state agency to claim savings.").
176. Id. at 274-75.
177. See generally H. Denman Scott, M.D., M.P.H., et al., Certificate of
Need: A State Perspective, 70 RHODE ISLAND MED. J. 341 (Aug. 1987).
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The actual figure for hospitals was much more modest. Hospital
projects totaling only 1% of the capital costs of all hospital projects
submitted during the fifteen-year period were not accepted, 9%
were withdrawn, 3.5% were denied, and 6% were modified.182 As
such, only 20% of the capital costs of hospital projects were
affected, totaling only $68.1 million in capital costs over a fifteen-
year period.183  For non-hospital projects, the results were
startlingly more negative. Twenty percent of the capital dollars
submitted by non-hospitals were not accepted.184 Nearly 19%
were withdrawn and another 13% were denied.185 The only
category that fared better for non-hospital projects was that of
modifications - representing only 5% of the capital costs
submitted.186 Thus, the authors' data supported Dr. Chazan's
criticism of the year before.187 Nearly 60% of the non-hospital
capital projects were affected by certificate-of-need, but only 20%
of hospital projects were so affected.188 As to the supply of beds
per 1000 population, that had actually been lower and below
national averages during the last pre-certificate-of-need year of
1967 when a population of 949,723 was supported by 3117
hospital beds for a ratio of 3.28 beds per 1000 population.189
Apparently aware of the disingenuous nature of their arguments,
the authors obliquely alluded to the protectionist aspects of
certificate-of-need in advancing, as a positive, the argument that
certificate-of-need minimized or prevented market-generated
failures, closures and dislocations, and thereby facilitated a
"stable and fairly predictable environment" for the management of
health facilities.190
In fairness, the authors did point to downsides of the
program. 191 They alluded to the potential for bureaucratic delays






187. See Chazan, supra note 171, at 273-74.
188. Scott, et al., supra note 177, at 342.
189. Id.
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of-need would respond "too conservatively to new ideas."193 The
authors even noted that well-established providers could use the
process to block the entrance of legitimate competitors into the
market, maintain the "status quo," and thereby protect inefficient,
outdated and weak providers.194
While recognizing the very same pitfalls that seemed to be
suggested by Dr. Chazan's earlier criticism, the authors continued
to view the 1985 legislative changes as positive, including the
passage of the CONCAP legislation, the addition of the request for
proposals (RFP) feature and pro-innovation criterion to the
certificate-of-need process, and the increase in the capital
expenditure thresholds.195
The authors then argued for further adaptive changes to
assure that certificate-of-need would serve the public interest
rather than the providers that were to be the subject of its
regulations.196 They proposed the concept of review of advanced
medical technology services regardless of cost, exemption of non-
clinical programs from review, and accelerated review of non-
controversial proposals (all of which came to be enacted by 1991)
and recommended two changes which were never implemented -
subjecting non-hospital proposals to the CONCAP and setting the
CONCAP for a three to five year period.197 (Either of these steps
may have extended the life of CONCAP in Rhode Island). In
closing, the authors argued that certificate-of-need was required
to aid in health care cost control, notwithstanding the fact that
health care spending had been accelerating since 1980 and that
even had there been a complete moratorium on approval of the
capital expenditures that had been submitted for review by
hospitals from 1971-1986, the impact on annual operating costs
would have paled by comparison with the increases associated
with the maintenance of the operating systems for Rhode Island's
hospitals taken in the aggregate.198  While the Department
emphasized aspects other than cost containment in its defense of
the program, the thrust of its argument continued to be that
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 343-44.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 344.
198. See id.
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certificate-of-need had more than incidental effects on cost in
these early years of the CONCAP phase. The Department's retort
invited one final rebuttal in December of 1987.199
In particular, the Department's citation of the 1984 CONCAP
law as major innovation to the process was subjected to pointed
criticism. 200 The CONCAP, by combining all programs into one
dollar package, forces the choice between equally good, but
unrelated, programs comparing apples with oranges. In a given
year, worthwhile projects may exceed or fall short of the CAP,
thus potentially excluding worthy projects or including less
needed ones.
All of these analyses were complicated by the concurrent
existence of the prospective rating agreement among Rhode
Island's hospitals acting through the Hospital Association of
Rhode Island, Blue Cross of Rhode Island and the State Budget
Office. An experiment begun in 1976 involving the Medicare
program, prospective rating continued without Medicare after
1978, and was widely regarded as the primary factor in
restraining hospital costs in Rhode Island through the early
1990s. In fact, the prospective rating program was so highly
regarded that one of its major elements, the MAXICAP, was
adapted through the CONCAP as a modification to the state's
certificate-of-need program.
The CONCAP decade probably represented the sole period
during the history of CON where some evidence of non-incidental
cost containment seemed to emerge from the data. As noted
earlier, the CONCAP limit was determined in annual negotiations
among hospitals, Blue Cross, and the State Medicaid program. 201
If the parties were unable to reach agreement, the CONCAP was
determined by an outside arbitrator. 202 The 1985 CONCAP did
not really provide a test of the new law because of the relatively
small number of projects and capital dollars proposed by
hospitals.203  In 1986, however, the parties were unable to
negotiate the CONCAP amount and an out-of-state arbitrator
199. Joseph A. Chazan, More on Certificate of Need, 70 RHODE ISLAND
MED. J. 531, 531-32 (1987).
200. Id. at 532.
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determined the final CONCAP threshold, supporting the third
parties' position of $1.7 million, roughly one-half the amount that
had been spent historically. Although all "needed" projects were
ultimately approved, in part by contributing more equity and
reducing interest expense, HARI was deeply troubled by the
absolute cost containment potential of the CONCAP process and,
in turn, published a white paper setting forth its arguments in
March 1987. While reiterating its long standing support for a
statewide voluntary health planning program and for continuation
of certificate-of-need review, HARI, nevertheless, provided an
overview of hospital capital spending in Rhode Island to disprove
the assumption underlying the passage of CONCAP legislation -
that hospital capital spending in Rhode Island had been excessive.
HARI also set forth the major problems it saw with the CONCAP
program as it was enacted and provided recommendations for
change to the CON program that it believed would obviate the
need for continuation of the CONCAP.
HARI felt that it had lost influence within the state planning
process and that its members had become subject to a project
ranking process that was, if not irrational, at least not replicable
in the scientific sense. It had fought against the idea of an annual
CONCAP during the proceedings of the Carcieri Commission and
although the Commission continued to study the issue and the
Department of Health seemed supportive of a multiyear
CONCAP, the influence of Representative Carcieri, a Health
Services Council member, within the General Assembly stymied
efforts to make any significant changes to the CONCAP process.
This 1987 report was the first volley in the almost constant
attacks by HARI on the CONCAP process during the period of its
existence. These attacks recurred notwithstanding the fact that
over the next several years, the CONCAP was successfully
negotiated each year and low-ranked hospital projects managed to
secure approval by shaving debt or reducing project costs. The
HARI concerns were not without effect as the CONCAP process
underwent further tinkering as a result of legislative amendments
in 1987,204 1988205 and 1991.206 One could argue that costs had
204. 1987 R.I. Pub. Laws 759 (shortening the time frame within which
CONCAP agreements must be reached from 270 days to 150 days after
initiation of health services council review).
205. 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws 470 (providing an exemption from CONCAP
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been contained during this period, but the containment was
largely symbolic, for many of the reasons articulated by the
Department staff in 1976.207 In fact, there was only one other
failure of the parties to agree to a CONCAP after 1986 and that
occurred in 1992. This time the hospitals succeeded in
arbitration. But the hospitals kept the pressure on and the
CONCAP provisions were finally repealed in 1994.
Whether significant cost containment was actually achieved
during the CONCAP years is largely irrelevant. The perception of
the hospitals was that their capital expenditures were being
unfairly and discriminatorily targeted. While the real impact on
costs was relatively modest, the fact that proposed new costs of
hospitals were subject to a more rigorous review than either
existing costs of hospitals or proposed new costs of non-hospitals
mobilized the hospitals to protest, and the CONCAP repeal that
resulted from the protest became corroborating circumstantial
evidence that CON had constrained costs sufficiently to make the
regulated parties object.
IV. NON-CONCAP EVENTS POST 1984
CONCAP was not the only development in the period from
1984 on. In 1985, even before the CONCAP law's first major test,
another set of amendments enabled the Department to achieve a
balance it had felt it lacked by introducing a criterion to favor
innovative projects and by giving the Department the authority to
achieve a degree of proactivity through an RFP process. The
Department attempted to combine the two shortly thereafter
through the issuance of an RFP for the provision of MRI
services. 208 To the Department's surprise, it found itself awarding
the certificate-of-need grant to a non-profit entity of which all the
provisions if the annualized expense for depreciation and interest associated
with all hospital capital projects included in a cycle is "four tenths of one
percent (.4%) or less of the aggregate total operating expense" of hospitals
during the preceding fiscal year).
206. See generally 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws 1030 (shortening and repositioning
of CONCAP negotiating process relative to start of certificate-of-need review
cycle).
207. R.I. DEP'T HEALTH, FACT SHEET: THE NEED FOR HEALTH RESOURCE
REGULATION, 76-H 7797, 1976 Sess. (1976) (on file with author).
208. See generally R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, REQUESTS FOR PROPOSALS FOR THE
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING SERVICES (1986) (on file with author).
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hospitals were members, which controlled the dissemination of
MRI services for a number of years and limited it to services
provided through the hospital network (RIMRIN).
In 1986, the various monetary thresholds were increased over
a three-year period, ending in 1988, to $600,000 for capital
expenditures, $250,000 for new services and $400,000 for health
care equipment. More importantly, the twenty-one month
experiment with coverage of expanded programs was terminated
as of June 27, 1986.
By 1987, the history of federal funding of capital expenditure
review had ended with the repeal of NHPRDA,209 and the state
was now modifying the law to accommodate its own interests
rather than those of the Federal government. As an illustration,
the legislative amendment of 1991 represented a significant
overhaul of the process. In addition to eliminating coverage of
outpatient rehabilitation, and increasing review thresholds, the
law exempted non-clinical expenditures, research, and bond issues
from review, introduced review of new or expanded tertiary
services regardless of capital or operating costs, as well as
accelerated review for one-for-one equipment replacement.210 It
also reduced the review period from 210 days to 120 days.211 This
legislative enactment sought to focus the Department's attention
on more important projects and, in fact, new or expanded tertiary
services became an ever-increasing focus of the Department over
the next decade and a half, to the extent that now it is one of the
cornerstones of the existing program.
The year 1996 was another watershed year. A New Director
of Health had arrived the preceding year from Colorado212 - a
state that had shed its certificate-of-need program after the repeal
of NHPRDA without appreciable adverse effect on health care
costs. 213 The Department mounted a serious effort to repeal
209. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
210. See 1991 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 290.
211. Id.
212. See Rhode Island Cancer Council, Inc., Members,
http://www.ricancercouncil.org/about/members/Nolan.php (last visited Mar.
5, 2010).
213. See Vivian Ho, Does Certificate of Need Affect Cardiac Outcomes and
Costs, THE JAMEs BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POLICY AT RICE UNIv. at 24 (July
2007), available at
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/CardiacCON1.pdf.
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certificate-of-need. 214 The effort was so serious that HARI went so
far as to amend the health department bill on the off chance that
some such bill would pass. 215 HARI's amendment proposed to
phase the certificate-of-need program out over the succeeding
four-year period216 rather than in one fell swoop upon passage as
the Health Department had proposed. As it turned out, the repeal
bills did not secure passage. Instead, two other bills were enacted.
In the first, home health agencies were dropped from coverage
despite the strenuous objections of the non-profit home health
agencies which found the certificate-of-need process as it was
being implemented not stringent enough, never mind a candidate
for repeal. 217
The year 1996 saw further streamlining of the certificate-of-
need law with the elimination of coverage of HMOs, free-standing
emergency rooms, outpatient hospice and organized ambulatory
care facilities of all types, complete exemption for one-for-one
equipment replacement, and further streamlining of the
exemption process for non-clinical and research projects. 218
Although the law was subject to additional changes throughout
the next decade, they were all in the nature of changes on the
margin, rather than substantive changes of substantial import.219
The Governor did propose repeal of certificate-of-need again
in 2003, but the hospitals did not support repeal and the effort
failed again. On the heels of that failure, the Department
determined that certificate-of-need was likely to survive as a
214. See generally 96-S-3032, Jan. 1996 Sess. (R.I. 1996) (on file with
author).
215. See generally id.
216. See generally id.
217. See generally 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 1674-89.
218. See generally 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 2110-29.
219. See 2006 R.I. Pub. Laws 1892-1910 (addition of health insurance
commission as affected party, elevate cost impact statements to level of
consideration in determining need, restore pre-NHPRDA concept of letter of
intent; change application fees; institute change for state use of experts);
2006 R.I. Pub. Laws 1975-80, 2372-77 (addition of safe patient handling as a
consideration in determining need); 2004 R.I. Pub. Laws 1476-79, 1775-79
(addition of community impact, relationship to capital development plan,
expansion of Health Services Council from 22 to 24 members); 1999 R.I. Pub.
Laws 921-26 (a technical change to the definition of "capital assets for new
health care equipment" that leveled the playing field for health care facilities
and individual practitioners).
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program indefinitely. Accordingly, it embarked on a two-pronged
effort to achieve policy gains through the certificate-of-need
process without the need for legislative change. Its first move was
to enforce conditions imposed on previously issued certificate-of-
need approvals. Over the period of the early 2000s, the rarity of a
hospital project denial had become obvious. Whether hospitals
were actually deterred from proposing projects or services for
system-wide or institutional needs, or they were constrained from
proposing all but absolutely necessary projects or services by the
constraints of the reimbursement systems, or whether the
Department's imposition of conditions eased Health Services
Council member consciences in instances where the need was not
readily apparent, is not easily ascertainable. Whatever the cause,
the occasional denial of hospital projects that occurred during the
early years of the program had now been replaced by, if anything,
lengthy delays and more extensive conditions. Historically,
however, those conditions, once imposed, were never routinely
revisited despite the obvious opportunity to do so annually at the
time of license renewal. In fact, until 2004, the only revisiting of
conditions occurred when hospitals voluntarily submitted change
orders or when they submitted new applications. Beginning in
2005, however, the Department made a concerted effort to
correspond with holders of certificate-of-need approvals of the
preceding few years and to demand compliance reports. The effort
revealed that many hospitals had failed to implement or had
violated conditions (whether inadvertently or consciously), which
had led to a marked increase in the number of change order
submissions - the purpose of which was either to seek
modification of one or more previously imposed conditions or to
seek deletion of conditions that had not and could not be
effectuated.
The second major development at this time was the
imposition of conditions that achieved Departmental public policy
objectives without regard to the relevance of those conditions to
the projects for which approvals were being rendered. A case in
point is illustrated by the November 2005 "Report of the
Committee of the Health Services Council on the Application of
Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island for a Certificate-of-
Need to Construct a Five-Story Addition and Increase the
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Licensed Bed Capacity," 220 which was adopted by the Director of
Health as his decision on November 2, 2005.221 The significance
of this approval was in the breadth of its conditions. In addition
to the normal regulatory conditions that apply to all approvals
and the customary project specific conditions relating to capital
cost limitation, minimum equity participation, incremental
operating cost limitation, data accessibility, non-discriminatory
service provision, and compliance with licensing regulations, the
Council recommended a series of wide-ranging additional
conditions and made mandatory an annual progress report on
implementation of not only the project but of each condition of
approval.222
One of the additional conditions required Women & Infants to
agree to work with the Department of Human Services, RIte Care
payors, and physicians in health centers, in private practice and
in hospital settings to develop and implement a pilot program as
an early intervention site for post-natal care of children born in
the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit.223 The hospital was
required to provide expertise through that program to assure that
community-based health services, including primary care, were
prepared to provide care for fragile infants in their
communities. 224 The hospital was further required to evaluate
the program to determine whether it reduced medical expenses
and improved outcomes and to make changes as appropriate to
enable the program to attain those ends.225 Given that the
application had simply proposed to replace the hospital's neonatal
intensive care unit, this extension of the hospital's obligation to
after-care in the community was an extraordinary step for a
regulatory process that had been largely reactive throughout its
220. See R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH SERVS. COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE
APPLICATION OF WOMEN & INFANTS HOSP. OF R.I. FOR A CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED
TO CONSTRUCT A FIVE-STORY ADDITION AND INCREASE THE LICENSED BED
CAPACITY (2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter REPORT ON WOMEN &
INFANTS].
221. Letter from David R. Gifford, Director of R.I. Dep't of Health, to
Constance A. Howes, President, Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I. (Nov. 2, 2005)
(on file with author).
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history.
The hospital was also required to address two Department-
identified problems: (1) prenatal care for women at risk for
premature births, and (2) unnecessary emergency room
utilization. 226 The connection between the first issue and the
hospital's request for additional NICU beds (i.e., with better
prenatal care, the need for NICU beds would presumably be
lessened) is relatively straightforward. However, the connection
between the hospital's request and the difficult problem of
emergency room utilization is less readily apparent.
Nevertheless, the Department viewed it as a priority issue in the
public policy arena and enlisted Women & Infants, as a successful
applicant, to assist in the effort to attack the problem.
Thus, the hospital was required to target communities with
documented high rates of pre-term births and expand its outreach,
education and early prenatal care in these communities. It was
also required to evaluate expanded clinic hours, review protocols
for triage of patients from the emergency room to the clinics
during those expanded hours, improve after-hours telephone
access to clinic patients and study the feasibility of pre-payment
for certain clinic patients.227
This robust extension of the conditional approval process
beyond the four corners of the application was taken to another
level less than three years later in the context of the Director of
Health's April 2008 decision on Kent County Memorial Hospital's
application to establish a pilot primary angioplasty program. 228
Here again, the Health Services Council, as had become its
custom, had imposed two conditions that were beyond those it
normally imposed on applicants - implementation of a definitive
agreement with an academic medical center with cardiac surgery
expertise and provision of quarterly volume and outcome
information - but both were directly related to the Kent
application. 229 While the Director of Health accepted the report of
226. See generally id.
227. See generally id.
228. See R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH SERVS. COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE
APPLICATION OF KENT COUNTY IMEM'L HOSP. FOR A CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED TO
ESTABLISH A PILOT PRIMARY ANGIOPLASTY PROGRAM (Mar. 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter REPORT ON KENT COUNTY].
229. See id.
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the Health Services Council and its conditions, he also added
fourteen conditions. 230
230. See id.; see also Letter from David R. Gifford, Director of R.I. Dep't of
Health, to Mark E. Crevier, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Kent County
Mem'l Hosp. (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with author). The additional conditions
were the following:
... 9. that, prior to implementation of the proposal, the applicant
will equip the EMS units serving Washington and Kent Counties
(that will serve Kent Hospital for primary PCI) to obtain and
transmit 12-lead EKG results to Kent Hospital's emergency
department, as well as maintain this capability;
10. that, prior to implementation of the proposal, the applicant will
purchase a lifepack 12 with blood pressure and pulse oximetry
monitoring for the Block Island Community Health Center;
11. that, prior to implementation of the proposal, the applicant will
develop standardized rapid screening and transfer protocol for
persons with STEMI with South County Hospital, Westerly Hospital
and execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), acceptable to
the Department, with each of these hospitals and provide a copy of
each such MOU to the Department;
12. that, prior to the implementation of the proposal, the applicant
will conduct initial training for EMS personnel in Washington and
Kent counties in the use and transmission of 12-lead EKG consistent
with Rhode Island Prehospital Care Protocols and Standing Orders,
and, subsequent to implementation, will conduct ongoing training
thereafter;
13. that the applicant will work with area EMS services to develop
procedures based on transporting patients directly to PCI-capable
facilities as consistent with the AHA mission Lifeline and described
in the Rhode Island Prehospital Care Protocols and Standing Orders;
14. that the applicant will monitor and report to the Department, on
a monthly basis for the first year of operation, door-to-balloon time
for all patients with STEMI and stratified for those arriving by EMS,
self-referral and transfer from another institution as well as cases
that present to the emergency room while the catheterization lab is
in use. Data should show number and percentage of patients
achieving door-to-balloon time in time increments (e.g. <60, 61-90,
91-120, 120-150, >150 or some other increments agreed by the
Department);
15. that the applicant provide primary PCI consistently on a 24/7
basis; consistently means selecting PCI as the treatment approach
for all clinically indicated STEMI patients requiring reperfusion
therapy;
16. that the applicant report data to a recognized national registry
acceptable to the Director of Health and provide annual reports from
the registry showing both the applicant's data and risk-adjusted
comparative data from the database;
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Of these, conditions nine and ten were particularly
noteworthy. During the review process, which extended
significantly beyond the normal 150 days, deficiencies in the
capabilities of community EMS departments were uncovered. 231
In prior years, such deficiencies would typically have been
reported to the affected communities with the expectation that
those communities, through their normal policy and budgeting
processes, would have addressed them. In this instance, however,
Kent Hospital was charged with the responsibility to purchase,
equip, and maintain twelve lead EKG units for all twenty-three
EMS agencies serving Washington and Kent counties. 232 Kent
17. that the applicant shall perform at least 36 primary
angioplasties per year and each physician at least 11 primary
angioplasties per year (and demonstrate that each physician perform
at least 75 total angioplasties per year) or at least the minimum
number as may be developed in the regulations;
18. that, prior to the implementation, the applicant develop a plan
to provide reports and findings of diagnostic cardiac catheterization
and primary angioplasty procedures in electronic form to Rhode
Island hospitals performing open heart surgery or angioplasty,
referral hospital in Kent and Washington counties and, where
feasible, to primary care physicians, when such reports and findings
are requested by a facility or a provider in connection with a
patient's care;
19. that the applicant implement the proposal, as approved;
20. that, prior to implementation, the applicant submit to the
Department within sixty (60) calendar days of approval a written
plan with timetables designed to demonstrate compliance with the
conditions set forth herein;
21. that the applicant shall notify the Department within seven (7)
calendar days of learning it is out of the compliance with any of the
conditions of approval; and
22. that failure of the applicant to comply with these conditions of
approval and any other requirements, including regulatory, as may
be imposed and/or developed by the Department related to the
subject matter of this application and the conditions referred to
herein may result in withdrawal of approval in whole or in part
andlor the suspension and/or termination of the primary angioplasty
program at Kent Hospital.
Letter from David R. Gifford, Director of R.I. Dep't of Health, to Mark E.
Crevier, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Kent County Mem'l Hosp. (April
2, 2008) (on file with author).
231. See generally REPORT ON KENT COUNTY, supra note 228.
232. Letter from David R. Gifford, Director of R.I. Dep't of Health, to Mark
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was also required to purchase a specific piece of equipment for the
Block Island Community Health Center - a service provider that
was outside of the primary or secondary service area of the
hospital. 233
This, therefore, represents the latest step in the effort to move
certificate-of-need from a reactive cost containment vehicle to one
that attempts to employ the regulatory process as a tool for
implementing public policy priorities. Furthermore, those public
policy priorities appear to be ad hoc and determined by the nature
of the application presented rather than products of a
comprehensive planning process. Nevertheless, in the absence of
the latter, a more rigorous conditional approval process may
represent one of the most effective tools that has been employed to
date by public health authorities to achieve public health goals.
So for the Department, certificate-of-need has a fresh vitality: one
that is premised not so much on cost containment as it is on using
a historically reactive process in a proactive manner to achieve
public health priorities that would otherwise likely remain
unsatisfied.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the cost containment record of
certificate-of-need in Rhode Island has been extremely difficult to
substantiate if only because certificate-of-need is but one of many
factors impinging on hospital costs. Review of cost impact
statements filed by the third party payors in recent years suggests
that the incremental costs associated with even the largest capital
and equipment projects are extremely small in comparison to the
collective operating costs of the hospitals. The Health Department
recognized this fact as early as 1976, defended the program for a
variety of reasons other than cost containment, and attempted on
several occasions over the last thirty years to repeal the law.
Each time, however, the hospitals argued strenuously against
repeal. Supportive of the concept of certificate-of-need from its
inception, the hospitals have collectively remained steadfast in
their support of the continuation of certificate-of-need, if only to
prevent the unlikely prospect of a new hospital's establishment in
2, 2008) (on file with author).
233. Id.
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an already overcrowded market. Because of the constant
legislative changes in entities covered, activities subject to review
and in the process itself, the Health Department has had to adapt
continuously over the years. Arguably, within the last five years,
it has discovered the combination of interventions that transform
a reactive process into one that can actually advance public health
agendas. The Department has done so by fashioning conditions
that go considerably beyond the scope of the projects and
programs that are the subjects of the approvals to which they are
attached. More importantly, the Department is actively enforcing
its conditions on an annual basis and monitoring hospitals to
assure that they actually implement those conditions. In
response, the hospitals have done little more than continue to seek
a level playing field, having determined that a regulatory program
that modestly stymies all existing hospitals periodically is
preferable to the prospect of a new hospital competitor or open
competition where access to capital becomes the sole determinant
of continued investment in plant and equipment.
The result is that we have the hospital system we have.
There are two fewer voluntary hospitals than there were in 1969,
but neither was forced out by certificate-of- need. Whether our
hospital system would be significantly differently configured now,
had certificate-of-need not been enacted to begin with or had it
been repealed at an earlier time, is open to speculation. No doubt
any attempt by a new hospital to enter the state would have
resulted in a legislative intervention of some kind. However, for
as much as the insurers complain about hospital costs and the
hospitals complain about inadequate reimbursement, Rhode
Island reached a state of equilibrium in the early 1990s that has
been preserved by a combination of certificate-of-need barriers to
entry and tightly negotiated reimbursement agreements.
Whether national health reform efforts will upset that state of
equilibrium is the next question. Meanwhile, the dance goes on.
On November 7, 2009, in a special session of the General
Assembly, chapter 197 of the Public Laws of Rhode Island, 2009,
was enacted. 234 The law calls for the extension of certificate-of-
need coverage to multi-practice physician ambulatory surgery
centers and multi-practice podiatry ambulatory surgery centers
234. 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws. ch. 197.
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and specifies in law for the first time specific services to be
included within the list of tertiary and specialty care services. 235
These services are not, however, cutting edge technologies. Full
body magnetic resonance imaging and computerized axial
tomography are services that had been included in the
Department of Health listing of tertiary and specialty care
services in the past, but had been removed from that listing once
they had become so widely dispersed throughout the state that the
justification for their special classification was no longer in
evidence. They had become lightning rods for the small
community hospitals in recent years as unregulated physician
surgery centers and non-hospital MRI and CAT scanning service
centers were opening and operating in the vicinity of the hospitals
without regulation. These interlopers were continually accused of
"skimming the cream" from nearby hospitals, without having to
discharge the free care and other obligations of those hospitals.
For both casual and seasoned observers of the certificate-of-
need revolving door, this is a curious piece of legislation. Coming
as it did forty years after the initial passage of certificate-of-need
legislation in Rhode Island and more than twenty-five years after
the last significant providers of services were added by the
General Assembly, it represents a return to the protectionist
environment in which Rhode Island's law was born. Ultimately,
this latest enactment underscores the primary reason for the
survival of certificate-of-need in the face of the Health
Department's historical vacillation between ambivalence and
antipathy. As noted herein, in the early years, when the Health
Department attempted to apply its programmatic tools equally
across all types of service providers, the non-hospital providers
disproportionately experienced denials and short- term cost-
containment effects in comparison with the hospital providers.
Even at this late date, when it would seem that all of the MRIs
and CAT scanners that are ever going to be introduced in Rhode
Island have already been introduced, the hospitals are willing to
reintroduce regulation of hospital provision of these services in
exchange for the opportunity to secure regulation of non-hospital
provision of these services. This suggests that the arguments
advanced in the early 1970s by the economists against public
235. See id.
185
186 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:127
utility regulation seem ripe for resurrection. Whether the
Department of Health's heightened emphasis on conditional
approvals will be sufficient to offset the defensive use of the
certificate-of-need process by the regulated sector for its own ends
remains to be seen.
